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RULES OF CHOICE OF LAW VERSUS
CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES: JUDICIAL
METHOD IN CONFLICTS TORTS CASES
ROBERT ALLEN SEDLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
In their admirable casebook, Professors Cramton, Currie,
and Kay observe that "American conflicts law in the middle
1970's seems to be divided between the adherents of the Currie
version of interest analysis on the one hand and the proponents
of narrowly drawn choice of law rules on the other."' Currie's
approach of interest analysis has indeed been the catalyst of the
"modern revolution" in choice of law in this country and has
resulted in the widespread abandonment of the broad, state-
selecting rules of the original Restatement in favor of a view of
* A.B., University of Pittsburgh; J.D., University of Pittsburgh. Professor
of Law, Wayne State University.
1. R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE, & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWs 7 (2d ed. 1975).
2. In addition to the 14 states whose decisions in the torts area are dis-
cussed at length in the present article, the "place of the wrong" rule of the
traditional approach has been explicitly abandoned in 11 jurisdictions. See
Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441
P.2d 699 (Alaska 1968); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254
(1968); First Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 182 Colo. 437, 514 P.2d 314 (1973); Jagers v.
Royal Indemnity Co., 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973); Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d
610 (Me. 1970); Pevoski v. Pevoski, 358 N.E.2d 416 (Mass. 1976); Issendorf v.
Olsen, 194 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1972); Fox v. Morrison, 25 Ohio St. 2d 193, 267
N.E.2d 405 (1971); Brickner v. Gooden, 525 P.2d 632 (Okla. 1974); Werner v.
Werner, 84 Wash, 2d 360, 526 P.2d 370 (1974).
A substantial number of states have refused to abandon the traditional
approach to choice of law in torts. In recent years, the "place of the wrong" rule
has been specifically adhered to and a "modern" approach rejected in 17 states.
See Spencer v. Malone Freight Lines, Inc., 292 Ala. 582, 298 So. 2d 20 (1974);
McGinty v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 241 Ark. 533, 408 S.W.2d 891 (1966);
Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); Friday v. Smoot, 58
Del. 488, 211 A.2d 594 (1965); Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d
743 (Fla. 1967); Wardell v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 133 Ga. App. 378, 210
S.E.2d 854 (1974); McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan. 625, 400 P.2d 1018 (1965); Brady
v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 254 Md. 598, 255 A.2d 427 (1969);
Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1969); Lorenzen v.
Continental Baking Co., 180 Neb. 23, 141 N.W.2d 163 (1966); First Nat'l Bank
in Albuquerque v. Benson, 89 N.M. 481, 553 P.2d 1288 (1976); Petrea v. Ryder
Tank Lines, Inc., 264 N.C. 230, 141 S.E.2d 278 (1965); Oshiek v. Oshiek, 244
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choice of law that emphasizes considerations of policy and fair-
ness to the parties.' At the same time, as Professor Cavers pointed
out so long ago in his seminal work on the choice-of-law process,
"Lawyers are a rulemaking sect,"' and the "modern revolution"
has not seen the disappearance of rule-oriented solutions. Quite
to the contrary, it has been cogently argued by academic com-
mentators, such as Professor Reese, that "itihe development of
rules should be as much an objective in choice of law as it is in
other areas."' Professor Reese maintains that the "current un-
popularity of rules in choice of law" is an overreaction to the
failure of the Restatement's rules, particularly in the torts and
contract areas, and that it "[dJoes not mean that satisfactory
rules cannot be devised in these areas, only that rules similar in
S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964); Heidemann v. Rohl, 86 S.D. 250, 194 N.W.2d
164 (1972); Winters v. Maxey, 481 S.W.2d 755 (Tenn. 1972); Marmon v. Mus-
tang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968); Chase v. Greyhound Lines, 195
S.E.2d 810 (W. Va. 1973).
There have been no reported decisions squarely involving choice of law in
torts in recent years coming from the appellate courts in Hawaii, Idaho, Mon-
tana, Nevada, Utah, Vermont, or Wyoming. The fourth circuit in Rhode Island
Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847
(4th Cir. 1972), takes the view that Virginia continues to follow the "place of
the wrong" rule, while the second circuit, in Marra v. Bushee, 447 F.2d 1282 (2d
Cir. 1971), takes the view that Vermont would now follow the "state of the most
significant relationship" approach. While there have been no decisions in this
area by the Indiana Supreme Court in-recent years, both the Indiana Appellate
Court and the seventh circuit have concluded that Indiana would likewise now
follow the "state of the most significant relationship" approach. See Watts v.
Pioneer Corn Co., 342 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1965); Witherspoon v. Salm, 142 Ind.
App. 655, 237 N.E.2d 116 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, 251 Ind. 575, 243
N.E.2d 876 (1969).
Putting Indiana and Vermont among the states that have abandoned the
traditional approach and Virginia among the states that have not, the break-
down among the 50 states and the District of Columbia is as follows: 27 have
abandoned the "place of the wrong" rule in favor of a "modern" approach; 18
have adhered to the "place of the wrong" rule; and six have not yet passed on
the question.
3. For a discussion of the meaning of the policy-centered approach, see
Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky: Judicial Method and the Policy-
Centered Conflict of Laws, 56 Ky. L.J 27, 57-61 (1967).
4. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv. 173,
193 (1933).




character to those previously attempted are unlikely to prove
successful."" As Professor Rosenberg has so neatly put it, "The
problem is to escape both horns of the dilemma by avoiding both
unreasonable rules and an unruly reasonableness that is destruc-
tive of many of the values of law and that loses sight of the need
for coordinating a multistate system, not merely vindicating sub-
stantive law policies."'
The development and utilization of narrow, policy-based
rules has been proposed as a "basic alternative" to interest analy-
sis and its "ad hoc" approach to the solution of choice-of-law
problems.' The effort, led by Professor Reese,' to develop such an
alternative bore judicial fruit in the decision of the New York
Court of Appeals in Neumeier v. Kuehner,' a case involving a
guest statute. The Neumeier court, in reliance on the views of
Professor Reese and other rule-oriented commentators," set forth
choice-of-law rules that could be extended by analogy to accident
cases in which guest statutes are not at issue.12
Since I am clearly an adherent of the Currie version of inter-
est analysis,' it should not be surprising that I would be highly
critical of a rule-oriented approach to choice of law or that I have
attacked such an approach elsewhere, both generally" and in the
context of the Neumeier rules.'5 My criticism, however, goes to
6. id.
7. Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 459,
464 (1967).
8. As to the contention that interest analysis necessarily involves "ad hoc"
solutions, see Reese, Chief Judge Fuld and Choice of Law, 71 COLUM. L, REv.
548, 559-60 (1971).
9. See generally Reese, supra notes 5 & 8.
10. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
11. Id. at 127, 286 N.E.2d at 457.
12. See Rogers v. U-Haul Co., 41 App. Div. 2d 834, 342 N.Y.S.2d 158
(1973) (Neumeier rules applied to issue of vicarious liability); Sedler, Interstate
Accidents and the Unprovided for Case: Reflections on Neumeier v. Kuehner,
1 HOFSTRA L. REv. 125, 135-37 (1973).
13. See generally Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice
of Law: An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 U.C.L.A. L. RaV. 181 (1977).
14. See generally id. at 208-16.
15. See Sedler, supra note 12, at 130-37. Other attacks have been made
on the Neumeier rules. See Hancock, Choice of Law Problems Posed by Anti-
guest Statutes: Realism in Wisconsin and Rule Fetishism in New York, 27 STAN.
L. IREv. 775 (1975); Trautman, Rule or Reason in Choice of Law: A Comment
on Neumeier, 1 VT. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1976); Twerski, Neumeier v. Kuehner: Where
Are the Emperor's Clothes?, 1 HOFSTRA L. REv. 104, 105 (1973).
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choice-of-law rules and to a rule-oriented approach to choice of
law. There is a crucial distinction, in my view, between choice-
of-law rules, such as those proposed by Professor Reese and artic-
ulated by the New York Court of Appeals in Neumeier, which are
formulated a priori and then applied to the facts of particular
cases, and rules of choice of law, which evolve from the decisions
of the courts in actual cases and result from the normal workings
of binding precedent and stare decisis. It is my contention 4 that
the courts should resolve conflicts problems on a case-by-case
basis with reference to considerations of policy and fairness to the
parties, 7 and that in time, through the normal workings of bind-
ing precedent and stare decisis, a body of conflicts decisional law
will emerge in each state. I call this process "judicial method."
The policy-centered conflict of laws and the rules of choice of law
that will emerge from judicial method differ sharply from the
choice-of-law rules, howsoever narrow and policy-based they may
be, that are formulated a priori to cover categories of cases and
then are applied deductively to all cases coming within each cate-
gory. 
s
The alternatives, therefore, are not choice-of-law rules versus
no rules and "ad hoc" decisions. The alternatives rather are
choice-of-law rules developed a priori and applied deductively to
particular cases versus rules of choice of law developed through
the normal workings of binding precedent and stare decisis in the
common-law tradition9 and applied to like cases with such exten-
sions or modifications as the court deems appropriate. Whatever
advantages claimed for choice-of-law rules will be equally real-
ized by rules of choice of law. The rules of choice of law will not
have the built-in disadvantages of (1) being developed in the
abstract, without regard to the concrete situations and differing
16. This theory has been developed more fully elsewhere. See generally
Sedler, supra note 3; Sedler, Characterization, Identification of the Problem
Area, and the Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws: An Exercise in Judicial
Method, 2 RUT.-CAM. I.,.J. 8. 9-17 (1970).
17. Primarily, the decision should be made in terms of the policies and
interests of the involved states.
18. For examples of such choice-of-law rules, see Reese, supra note 5, at
327-32.
19. As to the relationship between case-by-case determination, on which
interest analysis is based, and the common-law tradition, see B. CURRIE, SE-
LECFED ESsAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 627 (1963).
20. See Reese, supra note 5, at 316-17.
[Vol. 44
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policy considerations presented in particular cases,2 ' and (2)
countenancing unsound results in a particular case by the appli-
cation of a rule that "works well in the great majority of situa-
tions."22 In short, we do not need choice-of-law rules once we
recognize that by applying judicial method to the conflict of laws
we will have rules of choice of law.
In this article I will show how rules of choice of law in the
torts area can be and have been developed by policy-centered
courts23 in the. context of deciding the cases that have come before
them. I will also demonstrate that the rules of choice of law in
torts, once they are analyzed from the perspective of judicial
method, are substantially uniform and that, with only few excep-
tions, there is relative agreement among policy-centered courts as
to the proper solution to the kinds of problems that arise in prac-
tice. Such disagreement as there is can be likened to "majority-
minority views" in other areas of law. It should be emphasized
that my analysis is in terms of the results that the courts have
reached and not necessarily in terms of the explanations that the
courts have given for their decisions or in terms of the particular
choice-of-law methodology that they are applying." As I have
21. As to the problems this may produce, see the discussion of the applica-
tion of the Neumeier rules in practice in text accompanying notes 71-77 infra.
22. Professor Reese states: "A choice of law rule that works well in the
great majority of situations should be applied even in a case where it might not
reach ideal results. Good rules, like other advantages, have their price." Reese,
supra note 5, at 334. As he also put it:
More specifically, the fact that a choice of law rule which has stood the
test of experience would lead on some rare occasion to the application
of the law of a state which is not that of greatest concern, or would
result in the disregard of other multistate or local law policies, is not
an adequate reason why the rule should not be applied on that occa-
sion. Perfection is not for this world. The advantages which good rules
bring are worth the price of an occasional doubtful result.
Id. at 322 (footnote omitted).
23. I equate "policy-centered" with "abandonment of the traditional ap-
proach."
24. In this regard I have taken the same approach as was employed by
Professor Ehrenzweig in the ascertainment of what he called "true rules," in
that I have focused on results rather than on language or doctrine. See generally
R. CRAMTON, D. CURatE, & H. KAY, supra note 1, at 306; Ehrenzweig, A Proper
Law in a Proper Forum: A "Restatement" of the "Lex Fori Approach," 18 OKLA.
L. REv. 340 (1965). There clearly is a similarity between Professor Ehrenzweig's
concept of "true rules" and my concept of "rules of choice of law." Both con-
cepts look to the practice of the courts in deciding the cases that arise before
1977]
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discussed at length elsewhere," the courts that have abandoned
the traditional approach-regardless of the particular methodol-
ogy that they purport to apply"-in practice generally make the
choice-of-law decision with reference to the policies and interests
of involved states and considerations of fairness to the parties.
Moreover, whenever the courts have concluded that they have a
real interest" in applying their own law in order to implement the
policies reflected in that law, they have almost invariably applied
their own law." In other words, in practice the courts have been
applying the "Currie version of interest analysis." The rules of
choice of law that have emerged are rules developed within the
framework of interest analysis and thus properly may be ana-
lyzed with reference to the policies and interests of the forum and
the other involved states.
The reason that rules of choice of law can be developed from
the courts' decisions in actual cases is that conflicts cases tend
to fall into certain fact-law patterns. While these patterns are
very obvious in the torts area, they are apparent in other areas
as well.29 An analysis of the policies and interests of the involved
them, although I am limiting my analysis to "modern" cases. The difference,
however, relates to the frame of reference with which we approach these deci-
sions. I approach them with reference to the policies and interests of the in-
volved states, something that Professor Ehrenzweig categorically rejects. As to
the similarity between judicial method and the approach so long ago advocated
by Professor Cavers, see Sedler, supra note 3, at 87 n.270.
25. Sedler, supra note 13.
26. The majority of courts purport to follow the Restatement (Second)'s
"state of the most significant relationship" approach or Professor Leflar's
choice-influencing considerations, although some explicitly follow interest
analysis. See generally R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLc- s LAW ch. 11 (1968);
Leflar, More on Choice Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1584
(1966); Leflar, Choice Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 267 (1966).
27. I use the term "real interest" in contradistinction to a hypothetical or
possible interest. The forum has a real interest in applying its law to implement
the policy reflected in that law when that policy would be significantly advanced
by its application in the particular case. See Sedler, supra note 13, at 221.
28. Furthermore, when the question was raised, the courts have found that
this produces no unfairness to the other party. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Warren,
475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973); Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290
N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
29. In the contracts area, for example, it is possible to construct fact-law
patterns with reference to the states where the parties reside, the states where
significant events involving the transaction occurred, and the interest of each
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states in a particular case can be related to the fact-law pattern
presented in that case, and the decision can be applied directly
or analogously to another case presenting the same or a similar
fact-law pattern. Similarly, in deciding conflicts cases and in
developing rules of choice of law, the courts also set forth princi-
ples, as they do in other areas of law, and these principles likewise
serve as a guide to the resolution of future cases.
In the torts area, the fact part of the fact-law pattern relates
to the states where the parties reside, the state where the harm
occurred, and, if it differs, the state where the act or omission
causing the harm took place. The law part relates to whether the
law in question allows or denies recovery, whether it reflects an
admonitory or a compensatory policy or both, and whether it
involves other considerations, such as those applicable to
worker's compensation?.3 Thus a case may present a fact-law pat-
tern of an injury in a nonrecovery state involving two parties from
a recovery state, an injury in a recovery state involving two par-
ties from a nonrecovery state, or an injury in either a recovery or
nonrecovery state involving parties from both recovery and nonre-
covery states. A case may also involve a law reflecting an admoni-
tory policy, which may give rise to a different interest mix than
would be present in the same fact pattern if the law reflected only
a compensatory policy.
It is from these fact-law patterns that rules of choice of law
emerge. As will be demonstrated, not only do the courts of one
state decide cases presenting the same fact-law patterns the same
way, even when different substantive laws are involved, but also
the courts of different states, with only limited exceptions, tend
to decide cases presenting the same fact-law patterns in the same
way. What has resulted in the torts area is a fairly uniform series
of rules of choice of law that are followed, with only some dis-
agreement, by all courts that have abandoned the "place of the
wrong" rule.
I will first discuss choice of law in torts cases in New York
and in California in order to illustrate clearly the difference be-
state in applying its law to protect its resident or to regulate a transaction
connected with that state.
30. For a discussion of the considerations applicable to worker's compen-
sation, see Sedler, supra note 16, at 72-75. As we will see, these considerations
have resulted in a "uniform" rule of choice of law.
19771
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tween the use of choice-of-law rules, as reflected in the Neumeier
rules adopted by the New York Court of Appeals, and the devel-
opment of rules of choice of law on a case by case basis through
the use of judicial method, as has taken place in California. I will
then discuss the development of rules of choice of law in torts in
twelve other states: Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. By and large, I will be dis-
cussing only cases dating from the time when the particular state
expressly abandoned the "place of the wrong" rule. Cases involv-
ing different fact-law patterns have arisen in these states, al-
though the extent of conflicts litigation-not always proportioned
to the state's size or population-has varied significantly from
state to state. I have also tried to achieve some geographical
balance. Since a number of conflicts cases arise in federal courts
due to the continued existence of diversity jurisdiction, I have
included the decisions of the federal courts located in the selected
states. I have treated these decisions as decisions of the state
intermediate appellate or lower courts since the federal courts are
equally bound under Erie Railroad Co. u. Tompkins" and Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co."? to follow the deci-
sions rendered by the highest state court. While formulating the
rules of choice of law within the framework of interest analysis, I
will make reference to the methodology that the particular court
is "formally" following and indicate when this methodology may
have influenced the result in a particular case.
Since my focus will be on the development of rules of choice
of law, I will not discuss at length my agreement or disagreement
with the particular rules of choice of law. In the final section of
this article, I will discuss what may be called the general rules of
choice of law in the torts area-the rules that have emerged from
the decisions of the courts in these states-and will include deci-
sions supporting these rules of choice of law from other states. I
will also point up the areas in which there are "majority" and
''minority" views.
My thesis then is that judicial method, once it is properly
understood and applied to the process of deciding conflicts cases,
will lead to rules of choice of law that have all of the claimed
31. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
32. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
[Vol. 44
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advantages of choice-of-law rules without their built-in disadvan-
tages. Since these rules of choice of law have been developed in
practice within the framework of interest analysis, I will demon-
strate that there is no inconsistency between the approach of
interest analysis and the use of "rules" in deciding conflicts cases.
As long as the "rules" are rules of choice of law rather than
choice-of-law rules, the "conflict" between the "adherents of in-
terest analysis" and the "rulists" may turn out to be false in-
deed .
U. A TALE OF Two STATES
A. New York: The Rocky Road to Choice-of-Law Rules-
and the Rocky Road Thereafter
When the New York Court of Appeals heralded the "modern
revolution" in choice of law by its decision in Babcock v.
Jackson"' to abandon the "place of the wrong" rule, as might be
expected, it did so somewhat gingerly, taking an eclectic ap-
proach that "contained some comfort for all critics of the tradi-
tional system."" This eclectic approach, mixing interest analysis
and factual contacts, when applied to subsequent cases, resulted
in seemingly inconsistent decisions in Dym v. Gordon8 and
Macey v. Rozbicki."7 This uncertainty appeared to be resolved,
however, when the court, which had straightforwardly applied
interest analysis in areas other than guest statute immunity,"
came down, albeit by one vote, in favor of interest analysis in
33. A consideration of the "conflict" between those adherents of interest
analysis, such as myself, who favor the application of the forum's law in the case
of what Currie called the "true conflict," and those who have developed alterna-
tive means of resolving the true conflict is not necessary in the context of the
present writing. However, as we will see, in practice most courts apply their own
law in the "true conflict" situation.
34. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 NY.S.2d 743 (1963).
35. Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLUM. L. Rsv. 1233,
1234 (1963).
36. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
37. 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966).
38. See, e.g., Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d
372, 248 N.E.2d 576, 300 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1969) (contracts); Farber v. Smolack,
20 N.Y.2d 198, 229 N.E.2d 36, 282 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967) (wrongful death and
vicarious liability); Estate of Crichton, 20 N.Y.2d 124, 228 N.E.2d 799, 281
N.Y.S.2d 811 (1967) (property). See also Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237
N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
1977]
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Tooker v. Lopez." In Tooker the court held that New York law
applied when a New York plaintiff and a New York defendant
were involved in an accident in a guest statute state irrespective
of the factual contacts that the transaction had with that state.
Professor Reese has used the New York experience to illustrate
what he considers to be the unsoundness of interest analysis. He
noted that "[because of the uncertainty and unpredictability it
engendered, the court has been deluged by appeals and wracked
by dissent."'" It was in reaction to this "uncertainty and unpre-
dictability" that the Neumeier rules were promulgated.'
With all due respect to Professor Reese and to the New York
Court of Appeals, I would suggest that there would not have been
any "uncertainty and unpredictability" if the court as an institu-
tion42 had consistently applied interest analysis from the time it
decided Babcock. The court should have formulated a rule of
choice of law in that case with reference to the policies and inter-
ests of the involved states, particularly the policy and interest of
New York, the state in which both parties resided. The rule of
choice of law that the court could have formulated in Babcock,
based on its holding in that case, is that when two parties from
New York, a state that would allow recovery, are involved in an
accident in a state that would not allow recovery, New York law
applies. That rule of choice of law would have governed Dym,
Macey, and Tooker, which involved the identical fact-law pat-
tern, 3 and likely would have avoided appeals on the choice-of-law
issue in those cases.4 In any event, this is the rule of choice
of law that the court formulated in Tooker and subsequently em-
39. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
40. Reese, supra note 5, at 318.
41. See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 127, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457-
58, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 70 (1972).
42. Although the composition of the court had changed a number of times
during these years, the result in Neumeier can only partly be attributed to a
change of personnel from the time Tooker was decided. See Sedler, supra note
12, at 131.
43. Although the factual situations differed, all three cases involved two
parties from a recovery state (New York) and an accident in a nonrecovery state.
44. It should be noted that the number of cases involving choice of law is
miniscule in any event, so that the elimination of all appeals in these cases
would have no appreciable effect on the appellate courts' workload or on settle-
ment practices in accident cases.
[Vol. 44
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bodied in the first Neumeier rule so that it remains in effect
today."
That rule of choice of law-later converted into part of a
choice-of-law rule in Neumeier-was based on the principle that
since only the parties' home state had an interest in applying its
law on the point in issue, its law should apply; or in terms of
Currie's interest analysis, in the case of a false conflict, the forum
should apply the law of the only interested state. In light of this
principle, the holdings in Tooker and Babcock could be extended
to any other accident case without regard to the substantive issue
on which the laws differed and without regard to the New York
residence of the parties: when two parties from a recovery state
are involved in an accident in a nonrecovery state, recovery will
be allowed." The broader principle, relating to interest analysis,
is that when only one state is interested in applying its law on the
point in issue-in other words, the false conflict situation-its law
should be applied." This principle has in fact been consistently
45. See also Farber v. Smolack, 20 N.Y.2d 198, 229 N.E.2d 36, 282
N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967). In Pahmer v. Hertz Corp., 36 App. Div. 2d 252, 319
N.Y.S.2d 949 (1971), aff'd on other grounds, 32 N.Y.2d 119, 296 N.E.2d 243, 343
N.Y.S.2d 341 (1973), the accident occurred in California, involving a New York
plaintiff who was a passenger in an automobile leased from Hertz, a national
corporation with its principal office in New York. Although the particular vehi-
cle was registered in California, it was insured under a master policy issued by
an insurance company with its principal office in New York. The court held that
for purposes of tort liability Hertz was a New York defendant and that the case
was controlled by Tooker. See also Franklin v. Nelson Freightways, Inc., 408 F.
Supp. 670 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Stein v. Siegel, 50 App. Div. 2d 916, 377 N.Y.S.2d
580 (1976); Cunningham v. McNair, 48 App. Div. 2d 546, 370 N.Y.S.2d 577
(1975); Gyory v. Radgowski, 82 Misc. 2d 553, 369 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1974). In Juodis
v. Schule, 79 Misc. 2d 955, 361 N.Y.S.2d 605 (1974), two New York parties were
involved in an accident in Connecticut, and under Connecticut law the plaintiff
was limited to no-fault recovery and barred from maintaining a tort action. In
the context of ruling on a motion to amend the pleadings, the court noted that
New York had recently enacted a no-fault law and held that Connecticut law
would apply on the issue of no-fault recovery and the resulting exemption from
tort liability.
46. See Farber v. Smolack, 20 N.Y.2d 198, 229 N.E.2d 36, 282 N.Y.S.2d
248 (1967) (involving, however, New York parties). This rule, stated with refer-
ence to residence rather than with reference to recovery, is in effect embodied
in the first Neumeier rule.
47. New York as a recovery state was interested in applying its law to
allow its resident injured elsewhere to recover, since the social and economic
consequences of the accident and of allowing or denying recovery would be felt
in New York. Conversely, no policy of the state of injury would be advanced by
applying its law and denying recovery in favor of a New York defendant, since
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followed by the New York Court of Appeals in other cases.4
In Miller v. Miller,' the New York Court of Appeals was
presented with a different fact-law pattern. As a result of the
negligence of a Maine defendant, a decedent from New York, a
state that imposes no limitation on wrongful death recovery, was
killed in an accident in Maine, a state that did impose such a
limitation. 5 The court, although divided on the question, applied
New York law because of New York's interest in allowing recov-
ery,5 and because, as the court took pains to explain, the applica-
tion of New York law on this issue did not produce unfairness for
the Maine defendant or his insurer. 2 The rule of choice of law, if
the court had chosen to formulate one, could have been expressed
broadly or narrowly, depending on how far the court wanted to
go in that case. The rule could have been that whenever a New
York plaintiff is injured or killed by an out-of-state defendant in
the latter's home state, New York law allowing recovery will
apply, assuming that this is not unfair to the defendant. The rule,
however, could have been limited to wrongful death recovery,
although there would seem to be no sound reason for so limiting
it. The principle on which such a rule of choice of law would be
based is that the forum should apply its own law whenever it has
a real interest in doing so, provided only that the application of
its law is not unfair to the other party or the other party's in-
the consequences of imposing liability would be felt by the defendant and the
insurer in New York,
48. See note 38 supra.
49. 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
50. At the time of the suit the defendant had changed his residence to New
York, but in my view the result would have been the same in the absence of a
change of residence. For a discussion of this point, see Sedler, Weintraub's
Commentary on the Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on Torts, 57 IOWA L. Pav.
1229, 1236-37 (1972).
51. Whenever the plaintiff is from a recovery state and the defendant is
from a nonrecovery state, a true conflict is necessarily presented, since both
states are interested in applying their own law on the ground that the social and
economic consequences of allowing or denying recovery will be felt in the home
state. See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211
N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
52. The insurance policy covered accidents in every state and did not
distinguish between liability for personal injuries and liability for wrongful
death. As Professor Weintraub had emphasized, insurance companies are not
"unfairly surprised" by being held to liability for automobile accidents under




surer." The broader rule of choice of law, not limited to wrongful
death recovery, could be extended to all situations in which a
New York plaintiff is killed or injured elsewhere due to the negli-
gence of an out-of-state defendant. In the event that New York
is a disinterested third state,54 the broader rule could apply to all
situations in which a recovery state plaintiff is killed or injured
by a nonrecovery state defendant in the latter's home state."
These two situations were the only fact-law patterns in the
torts area that the New York Court of Appeals had dealt with
prior to Neumeier. Lower New York courts, however, had dealt
with another fact-law pattern in which two parties from a nonre-
covery state had been involved in an accident in New York and
had held that New York law, allowing recovery, applied." The
policy behind this rule of choice of law was based on New York's
supposed interest in allowing recovery to a nonresident injured in
New York."
In Neumeier, the New York Court of Appeals was presented
with a third fact-law pattern, that of a plaintiff from a nonrecov-
ery state, Ontario, injured by a defendant from a recovery state,
New York, in the plaintiffs home state. In terms of interest anal-
ysis, this situation is described as the "unprovided-for case," in
which neither state is interested in applying its law on the point
in issue. 8 The court made it clear that it considered recovery
53. This principle, in turn, incorporates Currie's view as to the proper
resolution of the true conflict.
54. This would be the case when, for example, neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant was a New York resident or the corporate defendant did not have its
principal place of business in New York.
55. Cf. Long v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d
796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965) (Pennsylvania wrongful death and survival stat-
utes applied to victims of plane crash over Maryland-Delaware border).
56. See Bray v. Cox, 39 App. Div. 2d 299, 333 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1972); Kell
v. Henderson, 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1965), aff'd, 26 App. Div. 2d
595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966).
57. I do not consider this interest to be a real interest; but as we will see,
the majority of the courts that have passed on this question do, and they have
applied their own law to allow recovery.
58. The plaintiff's home state is not interested in applying its law because
its policy is to protect defendants, and the defendant is not a resident of that
state, while the policy of the defendant's home state is to protect plaintiffs, and
the plaintiff is not a resident of that state. If the accident occurred in the
defendant's home state, it could be argued-although I disagree-that the state
was interested in applying its law to allow recovery to a nonresident injured
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improper here9 and could have so held by formulating a third rule
of choice of law, based on the fact-law pattern presented in that
case: when a plaintiff from a nonrecovery state is injured by a
defendant from a recovery state in the plaintiff's home state,
recovery will not be allowed. Instead, the court abandoned judi-
cial method and promulgated three choice-of-law rules, two and
one-half of which had nothing to do with the case before it. The
additional rules were applicable to guest-host immunity and pre-
sumably were capable of extension to all accident cases.
The first Neumeier rule is that when the guest-passenger and
the host-driver are domiciled in the same state and the car is
registered there, the law of that state should control and deter-
mine the standard of care that the host owes to his guest." This
choice-of-law rule incorporates the rule of choice of law promul-
gated in Babcock and Tooker, in which the fact-law pattern in-
volved recovery state parties involved in an accident in a nonre-
covery state. To this extent, the Neumeier court simply restated
existing law. In effect, however, it also reversed the rule of choice
of law promulgated by lower New York courts in a different fact-
law pattern in which parties from a nonrecovery state were in-
volved in an accident in New York, a recovery state. Since the
court of appeals had not previously decided such a case and was
not required to decide it in Neumeier, the promulgation of a rule
to cover this fact-law pattern is completely inconsistent with the
role of a court following judicial method in the common-law tra-
dition."
The second Neumeier rule, dealing with the situation of a
plaintiff from a recovery state injured by a defendant from a guest
statute state, was framed with reference to the location of the
accident: if the accident occurred in the plaintiff's home state,
the law of that state applied, 2 but if it occurred in the defendant's
there in the same manner as when two parties from a nonrecovery state are
involved in an accident in a recovery state.
59. "Was the New York rule really intended to be manna for the entire
world?" 31 N.Y.2d at 130, 286 N.E.2d at 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 71 (quoting Reese,
supra note 8, at 563).
60. 31 N.Y.2d at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
61. See Sedler, supra note 12, at 133-35.
62. The court stated that the law of the plaintiffs home state would apply
"in the absence of special circumstances," which the court did not undertake
to define. 31 N.Y.2d at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
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home state, the law of that state applied, and the guest statute
defense would be recognized.'- If the court intended that the sec-
ond Neumeier rule extend beyond the guest statute situation, and
there is no logical reason it should not have, the court thereby
engaged in a sub silento overruling of Miller v. Miller." In
Rosenthal v. Warren, 5 however, in which a New York victim was
killed in Massachusetts due to the negligence of a Massachusetts
defendant, a divided second circuit, applying New York law, held
that the Neumeier rules did not apply to limitations on wrongful
death recovery because of New York's "strong public policy"
against limiting liability in this area." In the same case, a federal
district court had held that the Neumeier rules did not apply to
charitable immunity either, so that New York law governed be-
cause of New York's interest in allowing recovery to the estate of
a victim from New York against a Massachusetts charity. 7
The third Neumeier rule dealt with the unprovided-for case
and covered both the situation in which the accident occurred in
the plaintiffs home state and the situation in which the accident
occurred in the defendant's home state. The court said that the
rule had to be "less categorical," but presumptively the law of the
63. Id. at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70. In Pryor v.
Swarner, 445 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir. 1971), the plaintiff was a resident of New York,
the defendant was a resident of Florida, a guest statute state, and the accident
occurred in Ohio, also a guest statute state. The trip began in Ohio and was to
end in New York. The second circuit, applying New York conflicts law, held that
New York would not allow recovery. The court based its decision on Judge
Fuld's concurring opinion in Tooker, in which he set forth the rules that were
subsequently adopted by the court in Neumeier. See also Hancock v. Holland,
63 Misc. 2d 811, 313 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1970) (Georgia guest statute applies to claim
by New York plaintiff injured in Georgia while a passenger in an automobile
operated by a Georgia defendant).
64. 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968). This overrul-
ing should also apply to Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d
526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961), on the assumption that Northeast Airlines was a
"resident" of Massachusetts, where it apparently had its principal place of
business.
65. 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973).
66. Id. at 442-45. The court's position in this diversity case was the same
as that of a lower New York state court interpreting New York law, as set forth
by the New York Court of Appeals.
67. Rosenthal v. Warren, 374 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). In holding
that New York law would apply on the issue of charitable immunity, the district
court gratuitously noted that Massachusetts' charitable immunity rule was
"regressive" and had since been repealed.
19771
TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW
state where the accident occurred applied unless "it can be shown
that displacing [the] normally applicable rule will advance the
relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth
working of the multi-state system or producing great uncertainty
for the litigants."' 8 In Neumeier, this rule required the applica-
tion of Ontario law denying recovery,6' whereas if the accident
had occurred in New York, New York law, allowing recovery,
would have applied. 0
The difficulty in applying categorical rules to particular fact
situations is demonstrated by the post-Neumeier experience of
the lower state courts and the federal courts in New York. On the
assumption that the Neumeier rules would apply to all accident
cases, as the lower state courts and New York federal courts have
assumed,7 Miller would seem to be overruled unless the second
circuit is correct in reading a wrongful death exception into the
second Neumeier rule. In Rogers v. U-Haul Co.,72 the appellate
division was faced with a situation of an Alabama resident killed
in a Pennsylvania accident as a result of the negligence of a New
York driver. The New York driver was operating a vehicle owned
by U-Haul, a nationwide concern doing substantial business in
New York. Under New York law, U-Haul would be vicariously
liable for the negligence of the driver, but under Pennsylvania law
it would not. The court did not discuss U-Haul's liability under
Alabama law. Applying the third Neumeier rule, the court held
that Pennsylvania law governed because the parties were from
different states.
68. 31 N.Y.2d at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
69. Martin v. Dierck Equipment Co., 52 App. Div. 2d 479, 384 N.Y.S.2d
479 (1976) (products liability claim of District of Columbia plaintiff injured in
Virginia by forklift manufactured by New York defendant was governed by
Virginia law, so that Virginia statute of limitations applied under New York's
borrowing statute). See atso Towley v. King Arthur Rays, Inc., 49 App. Div. 2d
555, 370 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1975) (Colorado guest statute applies in suit by plaintiff
from Iowa, which also has a guest statute, against New York defendant to
recover for accident in Colorado).
70. This was so held in the pre-Neumeier case of Frummer v. Hilton
Hotels Int'l, Inc., 60 Misc. 2d 840, 304 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1969) (English rule of
comparative negligence applies in favor of New York plaintiff injured in Eng-
land due to the negligence of an English defendant).
71. See Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973); Chila v. Owens,
348 F. Supp. 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Rogers v. U-Haul Co., 41 App. Div. 2d 834,
342 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1973).
72. 41 App. Div. 2d 834, 342 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1973).
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In terms of interest analysis, if Alabama law would have
imposed vicarious liability, Rogers would present a false conflict
and New York law would have applied. Since U-Haul would be
considered a New York defendant for tort liability purposes be-
cause of its substantial business in that state,73 this case would
have involved the same fact-law pattern as Tooker, namely two
parties from recovery states, albeit different ones, involved in an
accident in a nonrecovery state.4 This situation was clearly pre-
sented in Chila v. Owens,"5 in which the plaintiff was from New
Jersey, a recovery state, and the defendant was from' New York,
a recovery state, and the accident occurred in Ohio, a guest stat-
ute state. Because the plaintiff and defendant were from different
states, the third Neumeier rule, applicable by its own terms,
would have required that the court have looked to Ohio law.76
The court, however, treated the case as presenting a false con-
flict and applied the first Neumeier rule even though the parties
resided in different states. In Rogers the court applied the third
Neumeier rule without further inquiry and, in so doing, may have
produced the anomaly of applying the law of the "uninterested"
state to deny recovery solely because the parties were from dif-
ferent recovery states. If the parties had been from the same
recovery state, the plaintiff would have recovered.
Professor Reese has argued that "[a] choice of law rule that
works well in the great majority of situations should be applied
even in a case where it might not reach ideal results. Good rules,
like other advantages, have their price."" This price would not
have had to have been exacted if the New York Court of Appeals
in Neumeier had been faithful to the common-law tradition of
judicial method and had developed rules of choice of law based
on its decisions in actual cases. Instead, by promulgating choice-
of-law rules, the court may have overruled one of its own prior
decisions and clearly overruled prior decisions of lower New York
courts. The Neumeier decision covered cases that had not yet
73. See Pahmer v. Hertz Corp., 36 App. Div. 2d 252, 319 N.Y.S.2d 949
(1971), aff[d on other grounds, 32 N.Y.2d 119, 296 N.E.2d 243, 343 N.Y.S.2d 341
(1973).
74. See Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31
(1967); Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55 N.J. 511, 263 A.2d 129 (1970).
75. 348 F. Supp. 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
76. This would be true unless the court found the case t come within the
third rule's "exception."
77. See note 22 supra.
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arisen and forced lower state courts and federal courts in New
York to fit future cases within the constraints of the categorical
rules.
To illustrate this point more clearly, let us pretend that the
Neumeier rules had not been promulgated and determine what
the state of conflicts law would be in New York if the decisions
of the court of appeals and the lower courts had been framed in
terms of rules of choice of law. Looking to the decisions of the
court of appeals, the following rules would be in effect:
(1) When two parties from a recovery state are involved in an
accident in a nonrecovery state, recovery will be allowed under
Babcock and Tooker."8
(2) When a New York resident is killed or injured by a defen-
dant from a nonrecovery state in the latter's home state, New
York law allowing recovery will be applied, assuming this pro-
duces no unfairness to the defendant or the defendant's insurer.
This rule is consistent with Miller if Miller applies beyond the
wrongful death situation.9
(3) When a plaintiff from a nonrecovery state is injured by a
defendant from a recovery state in the plaintiff's home state,
recovery will not be allowed under Neurneier."
Looking to the decisions of lower New York courts prior to
Neumeier, the following additional rules would be in effect:
78. Although these cases involved New York residents, in the Kitberg
"spinoffs" the court had treated parties from other recovery states in the same
way as it had treated New York residents and allowed unlimited recovery. See
Long v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266
N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965); cf. Heaney V'. Purdy, 29 N.Y.2d 157, 272 N.E.2d 550, 324
N.Y.S2d 47 (1971) (when a New York resident was prosecuted in an Ontario
court on the complaint of another New York resident, Ontario law applied on
the question of liability for malicious prosecution; it appeared that liability
would not be imposed under either New York or Ontario law).
79. The rule is limited to New York plaintiffs because it is only in that
situation that New York would be faced with the question of whether to apply
its own law. If a plaintiff residing in another recovery state sued a nonrecovery
state defendant in New York, the situation presented would be that of the true
conflict arising in a disinterested third state, and no rule should be formulated
to cover this situation until it arises.
80. Strictly speaking, Neumeier dealt with a New York defendant. How-
ever, the court's obvious hostility toward allowing recovery to a plaintiff whose
home state did not protect him would likely carry over to bar recovery against
out-of-state defendants as well. A contrary result in this situation was reached
in Van Dyke v. Bolves, 107 N.J. Super. 338, 258 A.2d 372 (App. Div. 1969).
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(4) When two parties from a nonrecovery state are involved in
an accident in New York, New York law, allowing recovery, will
be applied.'
(5) When a plaintiff from a nonrecovery state is injured by a
defendant from a recovery state in the defendant's home state,
the law of the defendant's home state, allowing recovery, will be
applied .2
If these rules of choice of law had been in effect, there would
have been no question as to the results in Rosenthal v. Warren
and Chila v. Owens. The second circuit would have been bound
by Miller to apply New York law in Rosenthal; if Miller were to
be overruled, it was up to the New York Court of Appeals to do
so when a case presenting that question came before it. In Chila
the court without question would have allowed recovery under the
Babcock-Tooker rule. In Rogers the court would have looked to
Alabama law to see if it imposed vicarious liability. If it did, the
case would have been controlled by Babcock and Tooker, since
both parties were from recovery states, as in Chila. If Alabama
would have denied recovery, the holding in Neumeier would seem
to apply by analogy, and recovery should be denied.
In arguing for the necessity of choice-of-law rules, Professor
Reese has stated:
Throughout the ages the development of rules has been one of
the primary objectives of the common law judge. This has been
so because of the advantages that rules bring. Perhaps the most
obvious of these benefits are certainty and predictability, im-
portant factors not only for those planning future transactions
but also for those confronting either lawsuits or problems of how
much to offer or accept by way of settlement. An equally impor-
tant advantage of rules is the fact that they greatly facilitate the
judicial task. All that a judge need do when deciding a question
covered by a rule is to select the proper rule and then, after
gaining an understanding of its provisions, to apply it. "
However, when Professor Reese refers to the "primary objectives
of the common law judge," he is referring to judicial method-the
development of rules on a case-by-case basis through the normal
workings of binding precedent and stare decisis. It is only the area
81. See note 56 supra.
82. See note 70 supra.
83. Reese, supra note 5, at 316-17.
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of conflict of laws in which it is proposed that courts should
promulgate categorical rules a priori, as the New York Court of
Appeals did in Neumeier.4 The post-Neumeier experience, as
reflected in Rosenthal, Chila, and Rogers, indicates that a priori
rules, even if supposedly narrow and policy-based," have not en-
hanced predictability in New York and certainly have not served
to "greatly facilitate the judicial task." They may also produce
unsound results, as they possibly did in Rogers and clearly would
have done in Chila if the court had applied them literally.
The New York experience clearly demonstrates the unsound-
ness of the promulgation of choice-of-law rules and the desirabil-
ity, in contrast, of the development of rules of choice of law based
on the normal workings of binding precedent and stare decisis. It
may be too late to hope for a return to judicial method in New
York, but New York's experience with choice-of-law rules in the
wake of Neumeier should cause other states to hesitate before
embarking on such a course."0
B. California: Consistency and Rules of Choice of Law
At the opposite pole from New York, in terms of approach
to choice of law as well as geography, is California. The California
Supreme Court has consistently applied interest analysis to the
solution of choice-of-law problems and in the process has devel-
oped clear rules of choice of law in the torts area. 7 Prior to
84. In First Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 182 Colo. 437, 514 P.2d 314 (1973), in
which an accident involving parties from Colorado, a state not having a guest
statute, occurred in South Dakota, a guest statute state, the Colorado Supreme
Court adopted the first two Neumeier rules. Had the court proceeded in terms
of judicial method, it would simply have held that when Colorado parties are
involved in an accident in another state, Colorado law applies.
85. A priori rules do not appear to be so narrow when they must be applied
in the context of particular situations, and the policies on which they are pur-
portedly based are what may be called "choice of law" rather than
"substantive" policies, that is, policies other than those reflected in the laws of
the involved states.
86. Only Colorado has followed New York's lead in Neumeier.
87. Any discussion of conflicts law in California must make reference to
the comprehensive study of Professor Horowitz. See Horowitz, The Choice of
Law in California: A Restatement, 21 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 719 (1974). Professor
Horowitz has undertaken to review the choice-of-law decisions of the California
courts in all areas, including the "pre-modern" cases, and has set forth the
principles on which he believes those decisions have been based. In his view,
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Babcock, it held that when California law allowed recovery and
California parties were involved in an accident in a nonrecovery
state, California law would be applied." The California Court of
Appeal had held that when nonresident parties from a recovery
state were involved in an accident in California, the law of their
home state applied." In the post-Babcock case of Reich v.
Purcell," an Ohio plaintiff9' was killed in a Missouri accident by
a California defendant, and only Missouri law imposed a limita-
tion on wrongful death recovery. The California Supreme Court
held that the limitation would not be recognized. The rule of
choice of law that emerges, expressed with reference to recovery
rather than with reference to California residence, is that when
two parties from a recovery state are involved in an accident in a
nonrecovery state, recovery will be allowed. Since California is
expressly committed to interest analysis, the principle on which
the rule of choice of law is based is that when only one state is
interested in applying its law on the point in issue in order to
implement the policy reflected in its law-the false conflict-the
law of that state will be applied. In accordance with this rule of
California will apply the law of the only interested state in the case of the false
conflict. In the case of the true conflict, it will attempt to accommodate the
conflicting interests. Id. at 723. Since I am concerned only about the results in
actual cases and have limited my analysis to the "modern" tort cases, I am not
in a position to judge fully the accuracy of Professor Horowitz's conclusions.
Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215
(1976), is the one recent tort case that clearly presented a true conflict, in which
California concluded that it had a real interest in applying its own law and that
another state did as well. California, while purporting to reconcile conflicting
interests, resolved the conflict by favoring its own interests. Its behavior in this
regard is similar to that of most other courts when faced with a true conflict. I
tend to question purported reconciliations of conflicting interests, since in prac-
tice the forum almost always prefers its own policy and interest. A more exten-
sive discussion of Professor Horowitz's conclusions is beyond the scope of the
present writing.
88. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 489 P.2d 218 (1955); Grant v. McAu-
liffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953). For a discussion of these cases, see
Horowitz, supra note 87, at 731-32.
89. Bruton v. Villoria, 138 Cal. App. 2d 642, 292 P.2d 638 (1956).
90. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
91. Interestingly enough, the decedent was on his way to California when
the accident occurred, but the court assumed that he had not yet acquired a
California domicile and was not willing to look to the post-accident acquisition
of a California domicile by his survivors.
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choice of law, lower California courts have applied the law of the
recovery state both when California parties were involved in an
accident in a nonrecovery state 2 and when California was a
"disinterested third state."93
In Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 4 the California Supreme
Court was faced with a true conflict in which a California plaintiff
was injured in California by intoxicated patrons of a Nevada
gambling establishment operating close to the California border
and soliciting California customers. Plaintiff sought to hold de-
fendant gambling establishment liable under the California
Dram Shop Act.9 Although the court purported to resolve the
true conflict by the "comparative impairment" principle," the
court's approach was the same as that of most other courts when
resolving true conflicts, namely resolving the conflict in favor of
the application of the forum's law. Bernhard emphasized that the
application of California law was foreseeable to the Nevada de-
fendant because of its proximity to California and its solicitation
of California customers. As in substantive law areas, it is possible
to fashion a rule of decision limited to the precise facts of the case.
Apart from the "comparative impairment" question, however, it
is sound, at least for purposes of predictability, to fashion a
broader rule of choice of law from this case: when a California
plaintiff is injured in California by a defendant from a nonrecov-
ery state, California law will apply, as long as the application of
California law was foreseeable to the defendant. " The principle
92. Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314
(1972) (defendant munitions manufacturer was doing substantial business in
California, and its Mexican affiliate was not a party, although defective shell
causing the accident was manufactured and purchased in Mexico); Kelly v. Von
Koznick, 18 Cal. App. 3d 805, 96 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1971).
93. Fuller v. Greenup, 267 Cal. App. 2d 10, 72 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1968).
94. 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976).
95. No issue was raised as to the power of California to subject the defen-
dant to suit in California. Yet the same "foreseeability" considerations that
would justify the application of California substantive law here would justify the
exercise of jurisdiction under California's tort long-arm act. See Buckeye Boiler
Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
96. For a discussion of the "comparative impairment" principle, see Ho-
rowitz, supra note 87, at 749-58.
97. In Moore v. Greene, 431 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1970), the ninth circuit,
sitting as a California court, held that when letters, allegedly libelous of a
California resident and causing him emotional distress, had been sent from
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on which this rule of choice of law is based is that the forum will
apply its own law whenever it has a real interest in doing so, as
long as the application of its law is not unfair to the other party.
This is the same principle relied on by the New York Court of
Appeals in Miller to justify the application of New York law in
the case of a New York victim who was killed by a nonrecovery
state defendant in the defendant's home state.
In Hurtado v. Superior Court of Sacramento County," the
California Supreme Court held that when a victim from a nonre-
covery state was killed in California by a California defendant,
California law, allowing unlimited recovery for wrongful death,
applied.2 The court strongly intimated that California law would
apply simply because the defendant was a resident of California
and subject to unlimited liability under its law. "" Furthermore,
in response to the argument that California's "total governmental
interest" required that the law of the plaintiff's home state, limit-
ing recovery, be applied, the court also found a "deterrent" inter-
est in applying California law because the accident occurred in
California."' In any event, in view of the fact-law pattern pre-
sented in Hurtado, the rule of choice of law that the court promul-
gated must be limited to the situation in which an accident oc-
curs in California: when a plaintiff from a nonrecovery state is
injured or killed in California by a California defendant, Califor-
nia law, allowing recovery, applies.
The fourth rule of choice of law in the tort area in California,
based on the appellate court decision in Howe v. Diversified
Builders, Inc., "I is in accord with the universal practice of the
courts: the tort liability of an employer to an employee covered
Arizona to places in California and elsewhere, California law applied to deter-
mine the defendant's tort liability. The court emphasized California's interest
in applying its law to allow recovery to its resident injured there. Since the
defendant sent the letters into California, the application of California law was
foreseeable.
98. 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974).
99. Recovery would be allowed in this situation under the third Neumeier
rule, since the accident occurred in the defendant's home state.
100. 11 Cal. 3d at 581-82, 522 P.2d at 670-71, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 110-11.
101. Id. at 582, 552 P.2d at 672, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 111. For a discussion of
the "total governmental interest" argument in this situation, see Ratner, Choice
of Law: Interest Analysis and Cost Contribution, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 817 (1974).
Compare the discussion of Hurtado in Horowitz, supra note 87, at 745, n.74.
102. 262 Cal. App. 2d 741, 69 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1968).
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by worker's compensation is determined by the law of the state
where the employer has taken out worker's compensation to cover
the particular employee. 
03
The rules of choice of law in effect in California, then, based
on the decisions of the California courts in actual cases, are as
follows:
(1) When two parties from a recovery state are involved in an
accident in a nonrecovery state, recovery will be allowed under
Reich.
(2) When a California plaintiff is injured in California because
of an act done elsewhere that created a foreseeable risk of harm
in California, California law, allowing recovery, applies under
Bernhard.
(3) When a plaintiff from a nonrecovery state is injured in Cali-
fornia by a California defendant, California law, allowing recov-
ery, applies under Hurtado.
(4) Based on Howe, the tort liability of an employer to an em-
ployee covered by worker's compensation is determined by the
law of the state where the employer has taken out worker's com-
pensation to cover the particular employee,
In contrast to New York, California has developed clear rules
of choice of law based on the courts' decisions in actual cases.
Judicial method, which has been cast aside in New York, operates
with full vigor in California.
Equally significant are the tort choice-of-law questions that
are still open in California because cases presenting those ques-
tions have not yet been decided by the California courts. Again,
the California approach reflects the way courts are supposed to
operate in the common-law tradition, and the "uncertainty" this
produces is no different than the "uncertainty" in any other area
of law, where cases presenting particular issues have not yet
arisen. There has been no case involving two parties from a non-
recovery state injured in California when California law allows
recovery. California is committed to interest analysis, and should
such a case arise, the court would therefore make the choice-of-
law decision with reference to its assessment of the policies and
interests of the involved states. Since courts elsewhere have disa-
greed over the proper resolution of this question, ' it is hard to
103. For a discussion of the reasons for this rule, see Sedler, supra note
16, at 72-75.
104. See notes 283-85 infra and accompanying text.
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predict how the issue would be decided in California. In Califor-
nia, however, unlike New York, it will be decided only when it
arises. Similarly, there has been no case in California like Miller
or Rosenthal in which a California plaintiff was injured or killed
by a nonrecovery state defendant in the latter's home state. Guid-
ance in such a case may be found in the decision in Bernhard,
although that case is not directly on point because there the
injury occurred in California. Nonetheless, the principle that the
forum will apply its own law whenever it has a real interest in
doing so, as long as the application of its law is not unfair to the
other party, should apply here. In my view, this principle was the
basis of the Bernhard rule of choice of law. t 5 Hurtado strongly
intimated that California would apply its own law in the
Neumeier situation, in which a plaintiff from a nonrecovery state
is injured by a California defendant in the plaintiffs home
state.'"'
In this section of the article, I have demonstrated the differ-
ence between choice-of-law rules and rules of choice of law. The
contrasting experiences of New York and California indicate
clearly the advantages of formulating rules of choice of law and
of applying judicial method to the solution of conflicts problems.
I will now proceed to a discussion of the development of rules of
choice of law in torts in other states that have abandoned the
traditional approach to choice of law.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULES OF CHOICE OF LAW IN TORTS: A
STATE BY STATE ANALYSIS
In the states chosen for this analysis, torts cases involving
different fact-law patterns have arisen affording these jurisdic-
tions opportunities to fashion more than one rule of choice of
law.' 7 Cases dealing with admonitory torts bring into play differ-
105. It was this principle, rather than the application of the "comparative
impairment" principle, on which the Bernhard rule was based.
106. In In re Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975), the court
held, based on the Hurtado rule, that California law would govern the wrongful
death claims of all victims of an air crash due to a defect in an airplane that
was designed and manufactured in California.
107. 1 have tried to locate all of the reported torts conflicts cases decided
by the state and federal courts in each state. Starting with the cases with which
I was familiar, the so-called "leading" cases, I relied on the state digests and
the West key number system. The key numbers that I used were Action 17,
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ent policy considerations"" and give rise to their own special rules
of choice of law. A number of these states purport to follow the
Restatement (Second)'s "state of the most significant relation-
ship" approach; others purport to follow Professor Leflar's choice-
influencing considerations.'"" As pointed out previously, however,
in practice all of the courts that have abandoned the traditional
approach, regardless of whatever "modern" approach they pur-
port to follow, generally refer to the policies and interests of the
involved states in deciding the choice-of-law question and apply
their own law whenever they have a real interest in doing so.11
The particular approach adopted by the highest state court must
be followed and applied by lower courts and federal courts in the
state, and this approach may affect the result in particular cases.
These variations will be discussed as they arise. On the whole,
however, the rules of choice of law can be formulated in terms of
the policies and interests of the involved states and, more particu-
larly, in terms of residency and nonresidency and recovery and
nonrecovery. The state-by-state analysis will proceed in alpha-
betical order.
A. Illinois
In Ingersoll v. Klein,'"' the Illinois Supreme Court abandoned
the "place of the wrong" rule, adopted the state of the most
significant relationship approach, and held that when Illinois
parties were involved in a fatal accident in Iowa,"' Illinois law,
Automobiles 229V, Death 8, Negligence 1031.2, and Torts 2. I checked the ad-
vance sheets through February 15, 1977. While I may have missed some cases, I
do not think I missed very many, and I am reasonably sure that I did not miss
any "major" case. There were a few cases in which the choice-of-law question
arose only peripherally, as, for example, in interpreting the application of the
forum's borrowing statute or when there appeared to be no conflict of laws. I
generally did not include these cases.
108. The principal difference is that the state in which the conduct oc-
curred has an interest in regulating such conduct without regard to the residence
of the actor or the victim.
109. The states that follow the Restatement approach are Illinois, Iowa,
Mississippi, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and possibly Oregon. Those following the
Leflar approach are Minnesota, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.
110. New Jersey and, in my view, Kentucky follow "straight" interest
analysis.
S11l. 46 Ill. 2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970).
112. The accident occurred on the Iowa side of a bridge spanning the
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which would not impose substantive liability, applied. The hold-
ing was in accord with an earlier case, Wartell v. Formusa,"3  in
which the court held that Illinois law barring spousal suits
applied when Illinois spouses were involved in an accident in a
recovery state. These are the only two tort choice-of-law cases
decided by the Illinois Supreme Court after Babcock. Since these
cases were based on the Illinois residence of the parties, the rule
of choice of law emerging from them should be stated in those
terms: when Illinois parties are involved in an accident in another
state, Illinois law applies." The Illinois Appellate Court has ap-
plied that rule to the issue of guest-host immunity when Illinois
residents are involved in an accident in another state and has
held that Illinois law applies both when it is more favorable to the
plaintiff'6 and when it is more favorable to the defendant. "' This
court has also held that Illinois law applies to bar recovery on the
basis of contributory negligence when Illinois parties are involved
in an accident in a comparative negligence state."7
When an Illinois plaintiff was injured by a nonresident defen-
dant in the latter's home state,"' an Illinois federal court held
that Illinois would not recognize a limitation imposed by the law
of the defendant's home state on the amount of damages recover-
able on the ground that such a limitation would be against its
"public policy." The court noted that the failure to recognize the
limitation would not be unfair to the defendant.I" The same court
held, however, that under the state of the most significant rela-
tionship test, the standard of care was to be determined by the
Mississippi River.
113. 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966).
114. In Graham v. General U.S. Grant Post, 43 Ill. 2d 1, 248 N.E.2d 657
(1969), the Illinois Dram Shop Act was held to constitute a functionally restric-
tive substantive rule, inapplicable to an accident occurring in another state
involving an Illinois victim, although the intoxicating liquor was served by an
Illinois tavern-keeper in Illinois. See Sedler, Functionally Restrictive Substan-
tive Rules in American Conflicts Law, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 27, 55-57 (1976).
115. See Milton v. Britton, 19 Ill. App. 3d 922, 312 N.E.2d 303 (1974).
116. See Amundson v. Astrin, 15 Ill. App. 3d 997, 305 N.E.2d 685 (1973);
Cardin v. Cardin, 14 111. App. 3d 82, 302 N.E.2d 238 (1973).
117. See Blazer v. Barrett, 10 I1. App. 3d 837, 295 N.E.2d 89 (1973).
118. The accident occurred on a hunting safari in Mozambique.
119. Pancotta v. Sociedade de Safaris de Mocambique, S.A.R.L., 422 F.
Supp. 405 (N.D. Ill. 1976). See also Manos v. TWA, 295 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D.
Ill. 1969).
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law of the place where the accident occurred.' In another case,'
the Illinois Appellate Court applied the higher standard of care
imposed by the law of Indiana, the place of the accident, in a suit
by an Illinois plaintiff against an Indiana defendant. In terms of
interest analysis, this case presented a false conflict: the admoni-
tory policy reflected in Indiana's standards of scaffold construc-
tion would be advanced by application of Indiana law to scaffold
accidents occurring in Indiana, while no policy of Illinois would
be advanced by applying Illinois law to deny recovery in such an
accident. 2
There have been two federal court cases in Illinois involving
intentional torts in the conflicts of laws area. One case dealt with
false representations made in Illinois to an Illinois plaintiff who
entered into an employment contract covering work in Illinois
and other states 2 ' The other case involved misappropriation of
trade secrets of a Wisconsin corporation by a corporation having
its principal place of business in Michigan. Illinois was a disinter-
ested third state because the alleged misappropriation occurred
in Michigan.'24 Since in both cases the place where the act and
the harm occurred coincided, the resulting rule of choice of law
is the same as the rule for admonitory torts: when the act and
harm occur in the same state, the law of that state applies. How-
ever, the courts approached the question in both cases in terms
of "what law governs" and did not indicate the extent to which,
if any, the laws of the involved states differed.
Finally, in Illinois, as elsewhere, it has been held that the tort
liability of an employer to an employee who is covered by worker's
compensation is determined by the law of the state in which the
employer has taken out worker's compensation to cover the par-
ticular employee."'
120. It was not clear whether the standard of care under the law of Mo-
zambique was higher or lower than that existing under Illinois law. If it were
lower, in terms of interest analysis, the case would present a true conflict. If it
were higher, it would present the "unprovided-for" case.
121. Jackson v. Miller-Davis Co., 44 Ill. App. 3d 611, 358 N.E.2d 328
(1976).
122. The court also applied Indiana law to bar a claim for indemnity
asserted by the Indiana defendant against the plaintiffs Illinois employer. Id.
at 617, 358 N.E.2d at 333.
123. Wilhoite v. Festenware, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 856 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
124. Crown Indus., Inc. v. Kawneer Co., 335 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
125. Kabak v. Thor Power Tool Co., 106 111. App. 2d 190, 245 N.E.2d 596
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The rules of choice of law in tort in effect in Illinois, as
developed in the cases discussed, are as follows:
(1) When Illinois parties are involved in an accident in another
state, Illinois law applies.'
(2) When an Illinois plaintiff is injured in another state by a
resident of that state, Illinois law applies on the measure of dam-
ages.'"
(3) When an Illinois plaintiff is injured in another state by a
resident of that state, the law of the state that imposes a higher
standard of care on the defendant applies.'
2
(4) In the case of admonitory torts, when the act and the harm
occur in the same state, the law of that state applies.
2
,
(5) The tort liability of an employer to an employee covered by
worker's compensation is determined by the law of the state in
which the employer has taken out worker's compensation to cover
the particular employee.'
It should be noted that since only two cases in the torts area,
both presenting the same fact-law pattern, have been decided by
the Illinois Supreme Court, the other rules of choice of law in that
state must be considered tentative. The second rule has been
framed only in terms of the measure of damages, since that is how
a federal court, applying Illinois law, framed it. In addition, the
fourth rule of choice of law posited is necessarily limited in scope,
because it was not developed with reference to the content of the
differing laws. On the whole, then, rules of choice of law in the
torts area cannot be said to have been "extensively developed"
in Illinois.
(1969). The case arose in the context of a claim for indemnity made by an Illinois
manufacturer against the Ohio employer of an Ohio employee injured in Ohio
by the manufacturer's product.
126. See Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 111. 2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970); Wartell
v. Formusa, 34 II1. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966).
127. See note 119 supra.
128. See Jackson v. Miller-Davis Co., 44 Ill. App. 3d 611, 358 N.E.2d 328
(1976). Since the standard of care imposed by the state of injury in Pancotto
was not known, the case is of limited authority.
129. See Wilhoite v. Fastenware, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 856 (N.D. Ill. 1973);
Crown Indus., Inc. v. Kawneer Co., 335 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Ill, 1971). The
holdings in both of these cases likewise are of limited authority since there was
not a clear conflict of laws in either case.
130. See Kabak v. Thor Power Tool Co., 106 I1. App. 2d 190, 245 N.E.2d
596 (1969).
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B. Iowa
Like Illinois, Iowa is explicitly committed to the state of the
most significant relationship approach and, also like Illinois, has
held that its own law applies whenever Iowa parties are involved
in an accident in another state.' Berghammer v. Smith' pre-
sented the Iowa Supreme Court with the "unprovided-for" case
in regard to a claim for loss of consortium. At the time the acci-
dent occurred, the law of Minnesota, where the plaintiff and her
spouse resided, did not recognize an action for loss of consortium.
Both Illinois, the home of the defendant, and Iowa, the place of
the accident, recognized the cause of action, but the court held
that Minnesota law applied."' Therefore, the resulting rule of
choice of law is that when the plaintiff's home state does not
recognize a claim for loss of consortium, the claim will not be
allowed. The rule is expressed in these terms because in
Berghammer such a claim was allowed by the laws of both the
defendant's home state and the state of the injury. If the law of
the defendant's home state did not recognize such a claim, the
defendant's state would be interested in applying its law on the
point in issue in order to protect its resident and insurer from
liability. That different fact-law pattern would give rise to a dif-
ferent interest mix.
34
In Foster u. Day & Zimmerman,"5 the eighth circuit held
that when the fuse of a defective grenade was manufactured in
131. Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968); Flogel v. Flogel, 257
Iowa 54, 133 N.W,2d 907 (1965); Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W,2d
410 (1965). In Fabricius, the court said that the law of the state of injury applied
on the question of negligence. This statement is frequently made by the forum
when it applies its own law on the issue as to which a conflict exists. In my view,
this statement means that the laws of the state of the injury relating to the rules
of the road and the like apply as datum. As datum, they relate to the factual
question of whether the party's conduct was negligent rather than to whether
substantive liability will be imposed. See Fells v. Bowman, 224 So. 2d 109 (Miss.
1973). See generally Kay, Conflict of Laws: Foreign Law as Datum, 53 CALIF.
L. REv. 47 (1965).
132. 185 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1971).
133. The court decided, however, that the change in Minnesota law recog-
nizing the action applied retroactively to allow recovery in the instant case,
although Minnesota had refused to apply the change retroactively.
134. If the law of the plaintiff's home state did not recognize the claim for
loss of consortium either, a false conflict would be presented.
135. 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir, 1974).
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Iowa, and the grenade exploded at an army base in Georgia,
injuring a Washington plaintiff, Iowa law, imposing strict liabil-
ity, applied. This holding illustrates the application of the princi-
ple that the state in which an act occurs has an interest in apply-
ing its admonitory or regulatory policy to impose liability. As-
suming that the corporate manufacturer is considered to be a
resident of the state in which the manufacture took place, in
effect Foster presents a false conflict. Similarly, in cases in which
the act and the harm occur in the same state, the Iowa Supreme
Court and a federal court in Iowa have held that the law of that
state applies with respect to liability for admonitory torts.'36
These cases developed the following rules of choice of law in
tort in Iowa:
(1) When Iowa parties are involved in an accident in another
state, Iowa law applies.' 7
(2) When the plaintiffs home state does not recognize a cause
of action for loss of consortium, that claim will not be recog-
nized.'36
(3) When the law of the state in which an act or omission occurs
reflects an admonitory policy, the defendant will be held liable
when the act causes harm in another state. 32
(4) In the case of admonitory torts, when the act and the harm
occur in the same state, the law of that state applies.'
C. Kentucky
In the period between 1967 and 1972, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals (now the Supreme Court) decided three conflicts torts
136. Brooke v. Ranson, 376 F. Supp. 195 (N.D. Iowa 1974); Zeman v.
Canton State Bank, 211 N.W.2d 346 (Iowa 1973). Zeman involved an Iowa
plaintiff's claim that his property, situated in Minnesota, had been converted
as a result of a sheriffs sale. There was no showing of what Minnesota law was,
however, so Iowa law applied as the law of the forum. In Brooke, a case involving
claims for alienation of affections, most of the alienating acts occurred in Mary-
land, where the parties had resided, although some occurred in Iowa after the
spouse moved there. The court found that the alienation had been complete
prior to the move to Iowa. However, in an action brought by the child for the
alienation of the parent's affection, Iowa law applied, since the alleged alienat-
ing acts occurred in Iowa.
137. See note 131 supra.
138. See Berghammer v. Smith, 185 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1971).
139. See Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974).
140. See note 136 supra.
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cases, each presenting a different fact-law pattern. The court has
specifically rejected the state of the most significant relationship
approach in favor of a "sufficient enough contacts" approach,
which means that Kentucky law will apply whenever the court
concludes that Kentucky has an interest in applying its own
law.'4 ' In Wessling v. Paris, "2 the court applied Kentucky law on
the issue of guest-host immunity when two Kentucky residents
were involved in an accident in a guest statute state. In Arnett
v. Thompson,"' it applied Kentucky law to allow recovery when
two residents from a nonrecovery state were involved in an acci-
dent in Kentucky. In Foster v. Leggett, " a Kentucky resident
was killed in an accident in Ohio in an automobile driven by an
Ohio resident who worked in Kentucky and spent considerable
time there. The trip began and was to end in Kentucky. The court
held that Kentucky law applied on the issue of guest-host im-
munity.' 5 Although the court probably would have reached the
same result in the absence of these factual contacts, the rule of
choice of law may be limited to the precise situation presented
in Foster. Since all three cases involved either a Kentucky party
or a Kentucky accident, the rules of choice of law will be framed
entirely with reference to Kentucky. The Kentucky rules of choice
of law in tort are as follows:
(1) When Kentucky parties are involved in an accident in an-
other state, Kentucky law applies. 46
(2) When parties from a nonrecovery state are involved in an
accident in Kentucky, Kentucky law, allowing recovery, ap-
plies. '
141. See Sedler, Judicial Method is "Alive and Well": The Kentucky
Approach to Choice of Law in Interstate Automobile Accidents, 61 Ky. L.J. 378,
387-92 (1973).
142. 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967).
143. 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968).
144. 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972).
145. To the same effect in a very similar factual situation is Bennett v.
Macy, 324 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Ky. 1971). In Grant v. Bill Walker Pontiac-GMC,
Inc., 523 F.2d 1301 (6th Cir. 1975), the court, noting that Kentucky and North
Carolina law probably did not. differ on this point, held that when the accident
occurred in Kentucky, killing a Kentucky resident, Kentucky law would apply
to determine vicarious liability on the basis of a purported agency relationship
created in North Carolina.
146. See Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967).
147. See Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968).
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(3) When a Kentucky plaintiff is injured by a defendant from a
nonrecovery state in the latter's home state, Kentucky law, allow-
ing recovery, applies, at least when the transaction has substan-
tial factual contacts with Kentucky."8
D. Minnesota
Although the Supreme Court of Minnesota is explicitly com-
mitted to the use of Leflar's choice-influencing considerations,
the court has held that Minnesota law applies in all of the con-
flicts torts cases that have come before it. In the 1957 case of
Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel Co.,"I the court held that when a Min-
nesota tavern-keeper sold liquor to an intoxicated patron who
caused an accident in Wisconsin injuring a Minnesota plaintiff,
the Minnesota Dram Shop Act, imposing liability against the
tavern-keeper, applied. Similarly, the court has held in subse-
quent cases that when Minnesota parties were involved in an
accident in another state, Minnesota law, allowing recovery, ap-
plied. M5 In Milkovich v. Saari,5' the court held that when parties
from a guest 'tatute state are involved in an accident in Minne-
sota, Minnesota law, allowing recovery, applies.
Schneider u, Nichols' ,was a case like the Kentucky case of
Foster v. Leggett,'" in that the transaction, which resulted in an
accident in North Dakota involving a Minnesota plaintiff and a
North Dakota defendant, had substantial factual contacts with
Minnesota. The court held that the plaintiff needed to prove only
ordinary negligence and not the gross negligence required under
the North Dakota guest statute. In Schwartz v. Consolidated
Freightways,1" however, a Minnesota plaintiff was injured in an
accident in Indiana involving trucks owned by Ohio corporations
and traveling to states other than Minnesota. The trucking com-
panies did business in Minnesota and thus were subject to suit
148. See Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972).
149. 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957).
150. Meyer v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 508 F.2d 1395 (8th
Cir. 1975); Duffy v. Currier, 291 F. Supp. 810 (D. Minn. 1968); Kopp v. Rechtzi-
gel, 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526 (1966); Balts v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142
N.W.2d 66 (1966).
151. 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
152. 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968).
153. 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972).
154. 300 Minn. 487, 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974).
19771 1007
TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW
there, but the transaction in question had no factual connection
with Minnesota. The court held that Minnesota law, allowing
recovery on the basis of comparative negligence, applied. Assum-
ing that Ohio law would have denied recovery, the case presented
a true conflict. The application of Minnesota law can be sus-
tained by the application of the "interest and fairness" principle:
Minnesota has a real interest in applying its law allowing recov-
ery to an injured Minnesota plaintiff irrespective of where the
accident occurs. Since defendants did not "rely" on the Ohio or
Indiana law of contributory negligence in causing the accident,
there is no unfairness in holding them to the Minnesota stan-
dard. The rule of choice of law in this fact-law pattern then can
be stated without regard to factual contacts: when a Minnesota
plaintiff is injured in a nonrecovery state by a defendant from a
nonrecovery state, Minnesota law, allowing recovery, applies, as
long as this produces no unfairness to the defendant.
In Bolgrean v. Stitch,55 the plaintiff had moved from Minne-
sota to North Dakota, a guest statute state, and it was not clear
where she was domiciled at the time of the accident. The defen-
dant was a resident of Minnesota, a recovery state, and the acci-
dent occurred in South Dakota, a guest statute state. Finding it
unnecessary to determine the plaintiffs domicile, the court im-
posed liability on the basis of the defendant's Minnesota resi-
dence. Similarly, in Alien v. Gannaway, 15 some of the passengers
were not clearly Minnesota domiciliaries. The vehicle was driven
by a Minnesota defendant and was involved in an accident in
Nevada, a guest statute state. The court held that Minnesota
law, allowing recovery, applied. The rule of choice of law that
emerges from these cases is that when the defendant is a Minne-
sota resident, Minnesota law, allowing recovery, applies irrespec-
tive of where the accident occurs or where the plaintiff resides.
In deciding the unprovided-for case, then, the Minnesota courts,
unlike those of New York, which follow the Neumeier rules, look
solely to the defendant's Minnesota residence and impose liabil-
ity on that basis.'
The Minnesota rules of choice of law, stated with reference
155. 293 Minn. 8, 196 N.W.2d 442 (1972).
156. 294 Minn. 1, 199 N.W.2d 424 (1972).
157. This is the basis on which I would resolve the "unprovided-for" case.
See Sedler, supra note 12, at 137-39.
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to the application of Minnesota law allowing recovery, are as
follows:
(1) When Minnesota parties are involved in an accident in an-
other state, Minnesota law applies.' 5
(2) When parties from a nonrecovery state are involved in an
accident in Minnesota, Minnesota law, allowing recovery, ap-
plies.' 51
(3) When a Minnesota plaintiff is injured in a nonrecovery state
by a defendant from a nonrecovery state, Minnesota law, allowing
recovery, applies as long as this result produces no unfairness to
the defendant."10
(4) When the defendant is a Minnesota resident, Minnesota
law, allowing recovery, applies irrespective of where the accident
occurs or where the plaintiff resides.'
E. Mississippi
Although explicitly committed to the "state of the most sig-
nificant relationship" approach, Mississippi has in practice fo-
cused on the policies and interests of the involved states rather
than on factual contacts. Mississippi is generally a recovery state,
and when Mississippi residents are involved in an accident in
another state, Mississippi law, allowing recovery, applies."2 In
Vick v. Cochran,'3 the Mississippi Supreme Court faced a situa-
tion in which parties from Alabama, a guest statute state, were
involved in an accident in Mississippi. Unlike the majority of the
158. See Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel Co., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365
(1957); note 150 supra.
159. See Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
160. See Schwartz v. Consolidated Freightways, 300 Minn. 487, 221
N.W.2d 665 (1974).
161. Allen v. Gannaway, 294 Minn. 1, 199 N.W.2d 424 (1972); Bolgrean
v. Stitch, 293 Minn. 8, 196 N.W.2d 442 (1972).
162. Galloway v. Korzekwa, 346 F. Supp. 1086 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Fells v.
Bowman, 274 So. 2d 109 (Miss. 1973); Turner v. Pickens, 235 So. 2d 272 (Miss.
1970); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968). In Fells, Mississippi parties
were involved in an accident in Louisiana. To determine whether the defendant
was negligent, the court looked to the Louisiana rules of the road relating to
truck taillights and found that they were the same as those in effect in Missis-
sippi, thus rendering harmless an instruction under the Mississippi rules. See
note 131 supra.
163. 316 So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1975).
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courts that have considered this fact-law pattern, Mississippi,
correctly in my view,' held that the law of the parties' home
state, denying recovery, should be applied.' 5
The decision in Vick may call into question the fifth circuit's
earlier decision in Wright v. Standard Oil Co.' In that case, an
Indiana child was injured in an accident in Mississippi. The car
was driven by the child's father, who was admittedly contributo-
rily negligent, and the other vehicle was owned by a Kentucky
corporation. In a suit by the child's mother against the Kentucky
corporation, the court applied Mississippi law, under which the
mother had an action for the child's injury independent of that
of the contributorily negligent father. Indiana law would have
barred recovery by the mother. The court did not consider the
Kentucky law on this point. If Kentucky, like Indiana, did not
recognize a separate cause of action for the nonnegligent parent,
the situation would have been that of two parties from a nonre-
covery state involved in an accident in a recovery state. In Vick,
the parties were from the same nonrecovery state, and recovery
was denied. Since Mississippi purportedly applies the state of the
most significant relationship approach, the fact that the parties
in Wright were from different states might account for the incon-
sistent holdings. It is doubtful, however, that the Vick court was
influenced by this factual distinction. If Kentucky recognized the
claim of the mother, in terms of interest analysis, Wright would
have presented the "unprovided-for" case, involving a plaintiff
from a nonrecovery state injured by a defendant from a recovery
state in a recovery state. If a case like Wright arose again, Vick
would require that the court look to Kentucky law on the point
in issue before making the choice-of-law decision.
The rule of choice of law that emerges from Vick is probably
best expressed with reference to the residence of the parties: when
both parties residing in the same state are involved in an accident
in another state, the law of their home state applies. If the rule
is expressed with reference to residence and recovery, it would be
164. See Sedler, supra note 141, at 382-83,
165. A different question would be presented if the law of the state of
injury reflected an admonitory policy-for example, a law imposing liability for
intentional torts-since the state of injury would have a real interest in applying
its law to implement that policy whenever the acts occurred there. See Sedler,
supra note 16, at 67-78.
166. 470 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1972).
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that when two parties from a recovery state are involved in an
accident in a nonrecovery state, recovery will be allowed; but if
two parties from a nonrecovery state are involved in an accident
in a recovery state, recovery will not be allowed. If this is the rule
of choice of law and Kentucky disallowed recovery, Wright should
have been decided differently. This analysis of Wright clearly
points up the desirability of formulating rules of choice of law
narrowly and with reference to the precise fact-law patterns pre-
sented in the cases on which the rules are based. Since all other
Mississippi conflicts cases involved parties residing in the same
state, Mississippi's rule of choice of law should be formulated
with reference to residence rather than with reference to recovery.
The question of what law applies when parties are from different
states should be left open until a case presenting that question
actually arises. At the same time, it is also possible to formulate
two rules relating specifically to Mississippi: (1) when Mississippi
parties are involved in an accident in another state, Mississippi
law applies; (2) when nonresident parties from the same state are
involved in an accident in Mississippi, the law of their home state
applies.
In regard to admonitory torts, the Mississippi Supreme
Court held in Tattis v. Karthans'" that liability for a purely
admonitory tort, such as "actionable words," causing no tangible
harm to the victim, was to be determined by the law of the state
where the act occurred. In Hyde Construction Co., Inc. v. Koehr-
ing Co., '" however, a Mississippi federal court held that Missis-
sippi law governed liability for abuse of process. In that case, a
Mississippi plaintiff suffered tangible economic harm in his home
state as a result of his inability to enforce a Mississippi judgment
due to actions of a Mississippi defendant in another state.
The Mississippi rules of choice of law in torts derived from
these cases are as follows:
(1) When parties from one state are involved in an accident in
another state, the law of their home state applies."'
(2) Liability for admonitory torts causing no tangible harm to
the plaintiff is determined by the law of the state where the act
167. 215 So. 2d 685 (Miss. 1968).
168. 387 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Miss. 1974), modified, 546 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir.
1977).
169. See Vick v. Cochran, 316 So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1975); note 162 supra.
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occurred; when foreseeable tangible harm is caused to a Missis-
sippi plaintiff in Mississippi by an act done elsewhere, Missis-
sippi law, allowing recovery, applies.'70
F. Missouri
Missouri is also explicitly committed to the "state of the
most significant relationship" approach, but again, like the other
states following this approach, it has in practice focused on the
policies and interests of the involved states rather than on factual
contacts. Missouri does not have a guest statute, and in Kennedy
v. Dixon"' the Missouri Supreme Court held that when Missouri
parties are involved in an accident in a guest statute state, Mis-
souri law, allowing recovery, applies. There have been no cases
in which Missouri law has denied recovery to parties from a recov-
ery state injured in Missouri or to Missouri parties involved in an
accident in another state. The rule of choice of law, therefore,
strictly speaking, should be limited to the situation in which
Missouri parties are involved in an accident in another state and
Missouri law allows recovery. However, since all states have
held that their own law applies when their residents are involved
in an accident in another state, it is reasonable to formulate the
Missouri rule of choice of law here with reference to Missouri
residents.
Until very recently Missouri limited recovery for wrongful
death. In State ex rel. Broglin v. Nangle, "Ia Missouri victim was
killed in Texas due to the negligence of a Missouri corporation
having its principal place of business in Texas. Texas would have
allowed unlimited recovery for wrongful death. Applying the
"state of the most significant relationship" test, the Missouri
Supreme Court held that Texas law, allowing unlimited recovery,
applied.'73 Treating the defendant as a Texas corporation, since
it had its principal place of business in Texas, in terms of interest
analysis, this would present the "unprovided-for" case. The court
170. See Hyde Constr. Co., Inc. v. Koehring Co., 387 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.
Miss. 1974), modified, 546 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1977); Tattis v. Karthans, 215
So. 2d 685 (Miss. 1968).
171. 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969).
172. 510 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. 1974).
173. By the time the case reached the Missouri Supreme Court, the Mis.
souri limitation had been removed.
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in effect held that in this situation the law of the recovery state
applied.' In Griggs v. Riley,"5 the Missouri Court of Appeals
held that when residents of Illinois, a guest statute state, were
involved in an accident in Missouri, Missouri law, allowing recov-
ery, applies."' In General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Manufacturing
Co.,' a misrepresentation suit involving two corporations that
did business in a number of states, the eighth circuit held that
Missouri would look to the law of Texas where the harm occurred
and where the relationship between the parties was centered. The
Missouri rule of choice of law that emerges with respect to ad-
monitory torts is that when the act and harm occur in the same
state, the law of that state applies.
The Missouri rules of choice of law in tort, based on these
cases, are as follows:
(1) When Missouri parties are involved in an accident in an-
other state, Missouri law applies."'
(2) When parties from a nonrecovery state are involved in an
accident in Missouri, Missouri law, allowing recovery, applies."'
(3) When a plaintiff from a nonrecovery state is injured by a
defendant from a recovery state in the latter's home state, recov-
ery will be allowed.,"
(4) In the case of admonitory torts, when the act and the harm
occur in the same state, the law of that state applies."'
G. New Hampshire
New Hampshire is explicitly committed to the use of Leflar's
choice-influencing considerations, but in practice it has clearly
applied "straight interest analysis" to the resolution of conflicts
174. The same result would obtain under the third Neumeier rule. See text
accompanying notes 68.70 supra.
175. 489 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
176. The court based its decision, at least in part, on the somewhat ques-
tionable supposition that if the suit had been brought in Illinois, Illinois would
not have applied its guest statute. Subsequent cases indicate that Illinois would
have applied its guest statute. See notes 115-16 supra.
177. 481 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974).
178. See Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969).
179. See Griggs v. Riley, 489 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
180. See State ex rel. Broglin v. Nangle, 510 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. 1974).
181. See General Dynamics Corp. v. Seib Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974).
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problems.' 2 New Hampshire is a recovery state, except with re-
spect to limitations on wrongful death, and its rules of choice of
law in tort reflect both of these approaches. The rules will thus
be expressed with reference to both residence and recovery. When
New Hampshire parties are involved in an accident in another
state, New Hampshire law, allowing recovery, applies.' The
cases on which this rule of choice of law is based involved the
situation in which New Hampshire law allowed recovery. Yet in
a case in which New Hampshire residents are involved in an
accident in another state and New Hampshire law would not
allow recovery, New Hampshire would probably apply its own
law. An illustration might be that when a fatal accident between
New Hampshire parties occurs in a state imposing no limitations
on wrongful death recovery, New Hampshire law, limiting recov-
ery, applies.
In cases in which two parties from a nonrecovery state were
involved in an accident in New Hampshire, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court has rendered conflicting decisions. In Johnson v.
Johnson,' the court applied the law of the marital domicile,
Massachusetts, on the issue of spousal immunity to bar a claim
by one Massachusetts spouse against the other for an accident
occurring in New Hampshire.' In Taylor v. Bullock, I" in which
Massachusetts spouses had divorced subsequent to the New
Hampshire accident, the court did not try to distinguish Johnson
and yet held that Massachusetts law, which barred the suit de-
spite the divorce, would not be applied. In Gagne v. Berry,' the
182. In Hampton v. Exeter & Hampton Electric Co., 114 N.H. 589, 325
A.2d 778 (1974), the choice-influencing consideration of advancement of the
forum's governmental interest would dictate the application of New Hamp-
shire's law limiting liability for wrongful death to protect the New Hampshire
defendant, while the choice-influencing consideration of application of the
"better law" would lead to the application of Maine law, allowing unlimited
recovery. The court came down on the side of advancement of the forum's
governmental interests.
183. Dorion v. Dorion, 109 N.H. 1, 241 A.2d 372 (1968); Clark v. Clark,
107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193
A.2d 439 (1963).
184. 107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781 (1966).
185. Johnson was followed in Schneider v. Schneider, 110 N.H. 70, 260
A.2d 97 (1969).
186. 1il N.H. 214, 279 A.2d 585 (1971).
187. 112 N.H. 125, 290 A.2d 624 (1972).
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court held that when an accident involving Massachusetts resi-
dents occurred in New Hampshire, the issue of guest statute
immunity was to be determined by the law of New Hampshire
rather than Massachusetts. In my view, Johnson must be taken
as having been overruled by Taylor and Gagne,"' so that the rule
of choice of law in this situation is that when parties from a
nonrecovery state are involved in an accident in New Hampshire,
New Hampshire law, allowing recovery, applies.
In Maguire v. Exeter & Hampton Electric Co., ' a Maine
employee of a New Hampshire employer was killed in an accident
in New Hampshire. The court held that New Hampshire law,
limiting damages recoverable for wrongful death, applied. In
Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,"' the plaintiff, a New Hamp-
shire resident in the summer and a Florida resident in the winter,
was injured in New Hampshire due to a defect in a power saw
manufactured in Michigan, ordered from a retailer in Georgia,
delivered to the plaintiff's home in Florida, and shipped by him
to his home in New Hampshire. The court held that New Hamp-
shire's law of strict liability applied. The application of New
Hampshire law was supported by the "interest and fairness"
principle. New Hampshire had an interest in applying its law to
allow recovery to its summer resident injured there,"' and it was
foreseeable to the manufacturer and to the retailer, both of which
did business on a national basis, that the power saw could be
taken into any state and cause injury there.
All of these cases and the resulting rules of choice of law may
be explained by the "interest and fairness" principle: New
Hampshire will apply its own law whenever it finds that it has a
real interest in doing so in order to implement the policy reflected
in its law, so long as the application of its law is not unfair to the
188. In Gagne, however, the court did not mention Taylor, but it cited
Johnson and Schneider and said that the question of spousal immunity was to
be determined by the law of the marital domicile. Id. at 128, 290 A.2d at 626.
Strictly speaking, therefore, the rule should have a caveat in regard to spousal
immunity.
189. 114 N.H. 589, 325 A.2d 778 (1974).
190. 110 N.H. 248, 266 A.2d 855 (1970).
191. Under Gagne, that interest would have existed because the injury
occurred in New Hampshire, even if the plaintiff had been a nonresident. As
the court noted in Stephan, "The injury which furnishes the bases of the counts
on strict liability occurred here and we find no reason to apply any other law
than ours." Id. at 251, 266 A.2d at 858.
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other party. I have emphasized this point because the matter of
"interest and fairness" was presented in a first circuit case,
Barrett v. Foster Grant Co.,'" in which the court held that New
Hampshire would not apply its own law in an interstate accident
case involving a New Hampshire plaintiff. In Barrett, the plain-
tiff resided in New Hampshire and was employed by a New
Hampshire contractor. He was injured while working for his em-
ployer in Massachusetts on land owned by a corporation having
its principal place of business in Massachusetts. It was con-
tended, perhaps questionably," that under New Hampshire law
the landowner's duty of care to employees of independent con-
tractors was higher than the duty imposed by Massachusetts law.
New Hampshire clearly would have had a real interest in apply-
ing its own law to allow recovery, but the fairness of permitting
recovery would have been questionable. It could be argued that
the defendant might have conformed its conduct to the standard
required by Massachusetts law at least in a "gestalt" sense. A
landowner is generally familiar with the requirements of the law
of the state where the land is situated and here would not expect
to be required to take special precautions because an employee
of an independent contractor was on the land. If Barrett is not
explained with reference to the fairness problem, the resulting
rule of choice of law would be that when a New Hampshire resi-
dent is injured in a nonrecovery state by a defendant from a
nonrecovery state, recovery will be denied. Denial of recovery
under these circumstances is, as we will see, clearly a "minority
view."
The fact that the Barrett decision was rendered by the first
circuit rather than by the New Hampshire Supreme Court also
militates in favor of a narrow rule of choice of law. Therefore, the
rule of choice of law resulting from Barrett will be framed with
reference to the fairness consideration. With that understanding,
the New Hampshire rules of choice of law in tort are as follows:
(1) When New Hampshire parties are involved in an accident
192. 450 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir. 1971).
193. There were no New Hampshire cases recognizing such an expanded
duty, and the first circuit, sitting as a New Hampshire state court, was under-
standably reluctant to find that it existed under New Hampshire law. Holding
that Massachusetts law applied on this issue would avoid the necessity of its
making such a finding.
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in another state, New Hampshire law applies" '
(2) When parties from a nonrecovery state are involved in an
accident in New Hampshire, New Hampshire law, allowing re-
covery, applies."'
(3) When a plaintiff from a recovery state is injured in New
Hampshire by a New Hampshire defendant and New Hampshire
law does not allow recovery, New Hampshire law applies.'
(4) When a New Hampshire plaintiff is injured in New Hamp-
shire because of an act done elsewhere that created a foreseeable
risk of harm in New Hampshire, New Hampshire law, allowing
recovery, applies.' 7
(5) When a New Hampshire plaintiff is injured in a nonrecovery
state by a defendant from a nonrecovery state and the defen-
dant's conduct may have been shaped with reference to the law
of that state, the law of the defendant's state applies on the
question of standard of care." 8
H. New Jersey
Like California, New Jersey follows interest analysis without
any qualification. Cases involving interstate accidents, decided
by the state and federal courts in New Jersey, appear to be in
congruence. When New Jersey parties were involved in an acci-
dent in another state, New Jersey law-which in the cases pre-
sented allowed recovery-applied.' By the same token, recovery
was allowed when a plaintiff and a defendant from different re-
covery states were involved in an accident in a nonrecovery
state,2" and when two parties from a recovery state were involved
in an accident in New Jersey, the law of which did not allow
194. See note 183 supra.
195. See notes 182-86 supra and accompanying text.
196. See Maguire v. Exeter & Hampton Elec. Co., 114 N.H. 589, 325 A.2d
778 (1974).
197. See Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 N.H. 248, 266 A.2d 855
(1970).
198. See notes 192-93 supra and accompanying text.
199. Rose v. Port of New York Auth., 61 N.J. 129, 293 A.2d 371 (1972);
Mellk v. Sarasohn, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967); Raskulinecz v. Raskulinecz,
141 N.J. Super. 148, 357 A.2d 330 (Law Div. 1976). In the pre-Babcock case of
Koplik v. C.P. Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958), the court held that
the New Jersey law of spousal immunity applied in a suit between New Jersey
spouses involved in a prenuptial accident in another state.
200. Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55 N.J. 511, 263 A.2d 129 (1970).
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recovery on the point in issue.01 These holdings lead to two rules
of choice of law: (1) when New Jersey parties are involved in an
accident in another state, New Jersey law applies; (2) when two
parties from a recovery state are involved in an accident in a
nonrecovery state, recovery will be allowed.
In White v. Smith, 2 2 a federal court in New Jersey was faced
with the situation of a New Jersey accident involving Pennsyl-
vania plaintiffs who were seeking to recover against the New York
owner of a rented automobile. Vicarious liability would be im-
posed against the owner under the New York law, but it would
not be imposed under either New Jersey or Pennsylvania law.
Finding that the imposition of vicarious liability under New York
law represented an admonitory policy that New York would be
interested in applying to all New York automobile rentals,0 3 the
court held that only New York was interested in applying its law
on this point. The court found that the case presented a false
conflict2 4 and applied New York law. On the other hand, in
Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,"'4 thalidomide had been man-
ufactured in New Jersey and tested in New Jersey as well as in
forty-one other states. The third circuit held that this fact, stand-
ing alone, did not give New Jersey an interest in applying its tort
law in a suit to recover damages for birth defects caused by inges-
tion of thalidomide4A Plaintiffs from Quebec brought the suit on
the theory that the drug was inherently defective, not that a
defective batch had been manufactured in New Jersey. These
cases illustrate the rule of choice of law, explicit in White, and
201. Maffatone v. Woodson, 99 N.J. Super. 559, 240 A.2d 693 (App. Div.
1968).
202. 398 F. Supp. 130 (D.N.J. 1975).
203. Id. at 136-37.
204. If an admonitory policy did not exist, it would present the
"unprovided-for" case.
205. 508 F.2d 28 (3rd Cir. 1975).
206. The question arose in the context of determining whether the suit was
barred by the Quebec statute of limitations. Although New Jersey does not have
a borrowing statute, the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that if suit is
barred by the statute of limitations of the state whose substantive law applies,
it will be barred in New Jersey. Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d
412 (1973). If New Jersey substantive law would apply on any of the issues in
the case, therefore, the suit would not be barred unless the New Jersey statute
of limitations had expired, which it had not here. Since Quebec substantive law
applied, however, the suit was barred by the Quebec statute of limitations.
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following negatively from Henry, that when the law of the state
in which an act or omission occurred reflects an admonitory pol-
icy, the defendant will be held liable when that act causes harm
in other states.
In a suit against a New Jersey defendant for the wrongful
death of a Pennsylvania victim as a result of an accident in New
Jersey, a federal court in New Jersey applied New Jersey law,
limiting survival recovery to pain and suffering from the time of
injury to the time of death, rather than Pennsylvania law, allow-
ing additional recovery for impaired earning capacity beyond that
recoverable in the wrongful death action.2 "1 The rule of choice of
law in that case is that when a plaintiff from a recovery state is
injured in New Jersey by a New Jersey defendant, New Jersey
law, denying recovery, applies. In Van Dyke v. Botves,26 a New
Jersey appellate court applied the New York rule imposing vicari-
ous liability in favor of a New Jersey plaintiff injured in New
Jersey in a vehicle owned by a New York defendant. This is the
"unprovided-for" case with the accident occurring in the plain-
tiffs home state. The rule of choice of law emerging from this case
is that when a plaintiff from a nonliability state is injured by a
defendant from a liability state, the defendant will be held liable
irrespective of where the accident occurs.
Finally, in 1958 the New Jersey Supreme Court promulgated
the now "universal" rule of choice of law:2"' tort liability of an
employer with respect to an employee who is covered by worker's
compensation is determined by the law of the state where the
employer has taken out worker's compensation to cover the par-
ticular employee. 10
The New Jersey rules of choice of law in tort, based on the
decisions of the New Jersey Supreme Court, the New Jersey ap-
pellate courts, and the New Jersey federal courts, all of which are
in congruence, are as follows:
(1) When New Jersey parties are involved in an accident in
another state, New Jersey law applies."'
207. Colley v. Harvey Cedars Marina, 422 F. Supp. 953 (D.N.J. 1976). The
court declined to follow and thus effectively overruled an earlier case to the
contrary, Foster v. Maldonado, 315 F. Supp. 1179 (D.N.J. 1970), appeal denied,
433 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1970).
208. 107 N.J. Super. 338, 258 A.2d 372 (App. Div. 1969).
209. See note 30 supra.
210. Wilson v. Faull, 27 N.J. 105, 141 A.2d 768 (1958).
211. See note 199 supra.
19771 1019
TENNESSEE LAW RE VIEW
(2) When parties from a recovery state are involved in an acci-
dent in a nonrecovery state, recovery will be allowed.2 '
(3) When the law of the state in which an act or omission oc-
curred reflects an admonitory policy, the defendant will be held
liable when that act causes harm in another state.'
(4) When a plaintiff from a recovery state is injured in New
Jersey by a New Jersey defendant, and New Jersey law does not
allow recovery, New Jersey law applies."'
(5) When a plaintiff from a nonrecovery state is injured by a
defendant from a recovery state, recovery will be allowed."'
(6) The tort liability of an employer to an employee who is
covered by worker's compensation is determined by the law of the
state where the employer has taken out worker's compensation to
cover the particular employee.216
L Oregon
The Oregon Supreme Court has, in three cases, dealt directly
with choice of law in torts. In Casey v. Manson Construction &
Engineering Co.," 7 decided in 1967, the court abandoned the
place of the wrong rule and adopted in its stead the Restatement
(Second)'s "state of the most significant relationship" approach.
In Casey, an Oregon victim was injured in Washington by the
negligence of a Washington defendant. The court applied Wash-
ington law barring an action for loss of consortium, rather than
Oregon law allowing such an action. In terms of interest analysis,
Casey presented a true conflict. The Oregon Supreme Court thus
became one of the few courts in recent years to follow a "modern
approach" and to fail to apply its own law in a tort case that
presented a true conflict. ' In DeFoor v. Lematta,21' decided in
1968, the Oregon Supreme Court applied the "state of the most
significant relationship" approach to hold that Oregon law, which
limited liability for wrongful death, governed a suit between Ore-
212. See Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55 N.J. 511, 263 A.2d 129 (1970);
Maffatone v, Woodson, 99 N.J. Super. 559, 240 A.2d 693 (App. Div. 1968).
213. See White v. Smith, 398 F. Supp. 130 (D.N.J. 1975).
214. See Colley v. Harvey Cedars Marina, 422 F. Supp. 953 (D.N.J. 1976).
215. See Van Dyke v. Bolves, 107 N.J. Super. 338, 258 A.2d 372 (App. Div.
1969).
216. See Wilson v. Faull, 27 N.J. 105, 141 A.2d 768 (1958).
217. 247 Or. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967).
218. See notes 288-300 infra and accompanying text.
219. 249 Or. 116, 437 P.2d 107 (1968).
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gon parties arising out of a fatal accident in a state that did not
limit recovery. In dealing with the unprovided-for case, the Ore-
gon Supreme Court in the 1973 case of Erwin v. Thomas2 9 quali-
fied Oregon's adherence to the "state of the most significant rela-
tionship" approach.Y In Erwin, a Washington resident was in-
jured in Washington due to the negligence of an Oregon defen-
dant. His wife brought suit in Oregon to recover for loss of consor-
tium, an action barred by Washington law but allowed by Oregon
law. The court held that since neither state was interested in
applying its own law on the point in issue, Oregon would apply
its own law as the law of the forum.
The rules of choice of law that emerge from these cases illus-
trate the operation of the principles of binding precedent and
stare decisis. The authority of Casey may have been undercut by
Erwin, and there may be a question as to whether the Oregon
Supreme Court still adheres to the "state of the most significant
relationship" approach. Nevertheless, the holding of Casey,
which must be translated into a rule of choice of law for present
purposes, remains unimpaired and must be followed by the lower
courts and the federal courts in Oregon until overruled by the
Oregon Supreme Court. The rule of choice of law in Casey is that
when an Oregon plaintiff is injured by a defendant from a nonre-
covery state in the latter's home state, the law of the defendant's
state, denying recovery, applies. Of course, Casey, like any other
precedent, can be distinguished with reference to its facts. The
accident victim in Casey had been working in Washington for
some weeks when the accident occurred, so the case might not be
controlling if the Oregon plaintiff's contact with the accident
state was more "transitory. 2 22 Yet unless and until it is overruled
by the Oregon Supreme Court, Casey stands for the proposition
that when an Oregon plaintiff is injured by a defendant from a
nonrecovery state in the latter's home state, recovery will be de-
nied. DeFoor clearly establishes the rule of choice of law that
when Oregon parties are involved in an accident in another state,
220. 264 Or. 454, 506 P.2d 494 (1973).
221. The ninth circuit felt that Oregon had abandoned the "state of the
most significant relationship" approach in the Erwin case. See Forsyth v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 520 F.2d 608, 611-12 (9th Cir. 1975).
222. An example of such a situation would be when the plaintiff was
injured while driving through that state.
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Oregon law applies. Erwin, based on the forum's application of
its own law in the "unprovided-for" case, gives rise to the rule of
choice of law that when an Oregon defendant is sued in Oregon,
and Oregon law imposes liability, the defendant will be held lia-
ble. 223
In Davis v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., a federal court in Ore-
gon was faced with the situation in which the employee bringing
a tort action against the employer worked both in Oregon and
Idaho. In these circumstances the employer could elect to come
under the Oregon worker's compensation law, but he elected
against such coverage, so that under Oregon law a tort action
could still be maintained for work-related injuries. The employer
did elect to come under the Idaho worker's compensation law.
The injury occurred in Idaho, and the employee received benefits
there. In a tort action in Oregon, the court held that Oregon law
applied and allowed the action. Since the employer was subject
to the Oregon worker's compensation law but had elected not to
come under it, thereby remaining liable in a tort action, the hold-
ing is consistent with the rule of choice of law that the employer's
tort liability to an employee covered by worker's compensation
is determined by the law of the state where the employer has
taken out worker's compensation to cover the particular em-
ployee. In Davis the rule of choice of law is interpreted quite
properly to mean that when the employee works in more than one
state and the employer is subject to the worker's compensation
laws of both states, the laws of both states must be consulted to
determine the employer's tort liability. If tort liability exists
under the law of one of the states because the employer has re-
jected worker's compensation coverage there, that state will allow
a tort action against the employer.
223. In Myers v. Brickwedel, 259 Or. 457, 486 P.2d 1286 (1971), a Califor-
nia defendant, while in Oregon, engaged in sexual relations with the spouse of
a California plaintiff. Actions for criminal conversation had been abolished in
California but not in Oregon. The Oregon Supreme Court held that jurisdiction
attached in Oregon under its long-arm act, since the wrongful act had occurred
there, but expressly reserved decision on the choice-of-law question. Oregon
would clearly be interested in applying its law here to allow recovery, in order
to implement the admonitory policy reflected in that law; but since the court
expressly reserved decision on the choice-of-law question, the case cannot be
said to establish a rule of choice of law.
224. 289 F. Supp. 835 (D. Ore. 1968).
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Based on these cases, the Oregon rules of choice of law in
torts are as follows:
(1) When Oregon parties are involved in an accident in another
state, Oregon law applies." '
(2) When an Oregon plaintiff is injured by a defendant from a
nonrecovery state in the latter's home state, recovery will be de-
nied."'
(3) When the defendant is an Oregon resident, Oregon law, al-
lowing recovery, applies irrespective of where the accident occurs
or where the plaintiff resides. 27
(4) When an employer subject to the worker's compensation law
of Oregon elects not to come under it, and the employee, working
in Oregon and in a state where the employer has taken out
worker's compensation to cover that employee, is injured in the
latter state, the employee may maintain a tort action against the




Pennsylvania is explicitly committed to the "state of the
most significant relationship" approach. The establishment of
rules of choice of law in tort in Pennsylvania is complicated by
the fact that the last case decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court was in 1970, and the more recent cases have been those
decided by the third circuit and the federal courts in Pennsyl-
vania. When Pennsylvania residents are involved in an accident
in another state, Pennsylvania has held that Pennsylvania law
applies?' In other cases, the emphasis has been on the law of the
state where the accident occurs. This approach appears to have
been mandated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 1970 deci-
sion in Cipolla v. Shaposka.2 0 In that case, a Pennsylvania resi-
dent was injured in an accident in Delaware while he was a pas-
senger in an automobile operated by a Delaware driver. The acci-
225. See DeFoor v. Lematta, 249 Or. 116, 437 P.2d 107 (1968).
226. See Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'r Co., 247 Or. 274, 428 P.2d 898
(1967).
227. See Erwin v. Thomas, 264 Ore. 454, 506 P.2d 494 (1973).
228. See Davis v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 289 F. Supp. 835 (D. Ore. 1968).
229. Kuchinic v. McChory, 422 Pa. 620, 222 A.2d 897 (1966); McSwain v.
McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966); Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa.
1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
230. 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970).
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dent occurred during a trip that began in Delaware and was to
terminate in Pennsylvania. Suit was brought in Pennsylvania. 3'
In terms of interest analysis, the case, of course, presented a true
conflict, as the court recognized, and Pennsylvania would have
been justified in applying its own law under an "interest and
fairness" test. The court, however, emphasized the lack of factual
contacts that the particular accident had with Pennsylvania and
held that Delaware law would apply on the issue of guest-host
immunity. Pennsylvania, like Oregon, thus joined the few juris-
dictions that follow a "modern approach" and fail to apply their
own law in a tort case presenting a true conflict." 2 The rule of
choice of law that emerges from Cipolla is that when a Pennsyl-
vania plaintiff is injured by a defendant from a nonrecovery state
in the latter's home state, recovery will be denied, at least when
the particular accident lacked factual contacts with Pennsyl-
vania .33
When a Pennsylvania plaintiff is injured in Pennsylvania by
an act done elsewhere that foreseeably could cause harm in Penn-
sylvania, Pennsylvania law, allowing recovery, applies. This is
illustrated by the decision of the third circuit in Suchomajcz v.
Hummel Chemical Co.2 Hummel, a New Jersey mar uTacturer,
sold chemicals to Christie, a New Jersey party. It was alleged that
Hummel knew that Christie would use the chemicals to manufac-
ture and sell firecracker assembly kits in violation of federal law
and a federal court order forbidding him from shipping the kits
into interstate commerce. A minor from Pennsylvania ordered the
kit in response to a magazine advertisement. The child left the
partially assembled kit in a park. Two days later, someone threw
a match into the kit, which exploded. Two children were killed
231. See Sedler, The Territorial Imperative: Automobile Accidents and
the Significance of a State Line, 9 Duq. L. REv. 394 (1971). The exercise of in
personam jurisdiction solely on the basis of service of process in the state is
apparently unconstitutional after Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
232. For discussion of Cipolla, see Sedler, supra note 231, at 394-96, 402-
03.
233. In Cavallaro v. Williams, 530 F.2d 473 (3d Cir. 1975), the third
circuit, sitting as a Pennsylvania state court, held that when a Pennsylvania
plaintiff and a New York defendant were involved in an accident in Maryland,
Maryland law applied on the standard of care. The parties did not object to the
application of Maryland law on this point, and the matter in question related
more to a "rule of the road" than to substantive liability.
234. 524 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1975).
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and four injured. Describing Hummel as "reverse Cipolla," the
court held that Pennsylvania law, imposing liability bn Hummel,
applied. The court said that the Cipolla principle was that in the
case of a true conflict, the law of the state where the accident
occurred applies,
A year earlier, however, in Zurzola v. General Motors
Corp.,25 a divided third circuit did not apply Pennsylvania law
in a case in which Pennsylvania had a real interest in doing so
notwithstanding the fact that the accident occurred in Pennsyl-
vania. New Jersey spouses were involved in an accident in Penn-
sylvania with a Pennsylvania driver. After being sued by the wife,
the Pennsylvania driver sought to join the admittedly negligent
husband as a third-party defendant in order to obtain contribu-
tion. Since New Jersey recognized spousal immunity, the hus-
band would not be liable for contribution to the other driver.
Pennsylvania had a real interest in applying its law on the ques-
tion of contribution in order to allow contribution to a Pennsyl-
vania driver involved in an accident there, and under the Cipolla
rationale it would seem that Pennsylvania law should have ap-
plied. The majority, however, erroneously"" likened Zurzola to a
case in which Pennsylvania had applied its own law denying re-
covery on grounds of spousal immunity when Pennsylvania
spouses were involved in an accident in a nonimmunity state.
237
The court held that New Jersey was the state of the most signifi-
cant relationship on the issue of spousal immunity-contribution.
While Zurzola is questionable and might very well be disap-
proved by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,2' it establishes a
rule of choice of law in the same manner as would a decision of a
state intermediate appellate court: when the defendant is im-
mune from contribution under the law of the marital domicile,
contribution between defendant-spouse and the other defendant
will not be allowed in a suit by the defendant's spouse against the
other driver.
Pennsylvania also has held that New Jersey law applies when
a claim for contribution is made by a Pennsylvania tortfeasor
235. 503 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1974).
236. See Sedler, supra note 16, at 65-66.
237. McrSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966).
238. In the same situation, Wisconsin has held that its law allowing contri-
bution applies in favor of the Wisconsin defendant. See note 260 infra.
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against a New Jersey employer who paid worker's compensation
to the employee injured in a Pennsylvania accident. The em-
ployee was covered under New Jersey law, which immunized the
employer against liability for contribution. 3 ' This case presents
another example of the rule of choice of law that the tort liability
of an employer to an employee covered by worker's compensation
is determined by the law of the state where the employer has
taken out worker's compensation to cover the particular em-
ployee.24"
Based on these cases, the Pennsylvania rules of choice of law
in tort are as follows:
(1) When Pennsylvania parties are involved in an accident in
another state, Pennsylvania law applies.2"'
(2) When a Pennsylvania plaintiff is injured by a defendant
from a nonrecovery state in the latter's home state, the law of the
defendant's state, denying recovery, applies, at least when the
transaction giving rise to the accident was not factually con-
nected with Pennsylvania."
(3) When a Pennsylvania plaintiff is injured in Pennsylvania
because of an act done elsewhere that created a foreseeable risk
of harm in Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania law, allowing recovery,
applies."3
(4) When the defendant is immune from contribution under the
law of the marital domicile, contribution will not be allowed in a
suit by the defendant's spouse against the other party to the
accident.'
(5) The tort liability of an employer to a third party with respect
to an employee covered by worker's compensation is determined
by the law of the state in which the employer has taken out
worker's compensation to cover the particular employee 4 5
K. Rhode Island
Rhode Island, explicitly committed to Leflar's choice-
239. Elston v. Industrial Lift Truck Co., 420 Pa. 97, 216 A.2d 318 (1966).
240. See also Madrin v. Wareham, 344 F. Supp. 166 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
241. See note 229 supra.
242. See Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970).
243. See Suchomajcz v. Hummel Chem. Co., 524 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1975).
244. See Zurzola v. General Motors Corp., 503 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1974).




influencing considerations, in practice makes the choice-of-law
decision with reference to the policies and interests of the in-
volved states. When Rhode Island parties are involved in an acci-
dent elsewhere, in accordance with the "universal" rule of choice
of law, Rhode Island law applies.2" In Turcotte v. Ford Motor
Co.,2"7 the first circuit held that when a Rhode Island victim was
killed in Massachusetts as a result of a defect in a vehicle pur-
chased in Massachusetts,"' Rhode Island law, imposing strict
liability and allowing unlimited recovery for wrongful death, ap-
plied. Thus the rule of choice of law established by this case is
that when a Rhode Island plaintiff is involved in an accident in
a nonrecovery state, Rhode Island law, allowing recovery, applies,
as long as allowing recovery produces no unfairness to the defen-
dant.
In Labree v. Major,291 the Rhode Island Supreme Court was
presented with the "unprovided-for" case. A plaintiff from Mas-
sachusetts, a guest-statute state, was injured in Massachusetts
while a passenger in the automobile of a defendant from Rhode
Island, a recovery state. Unlike the Oregon court in Erwin, which
based its decision on forum preference, the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court in Labree based its decision on the fact that the
defendant was from a recovery state. The resulting choice-of-law
rule is that when the defendant is from a recovery state, recovery
will be allowed irrespective of where the plaintiff resides or where
the accident occurred.
In Gravina v, Brunswick Corp.,5 0 suit was brought in a
Rhode Island federal court by a Rhode Island plaintiff to recover
for invasion of privacy resulting from the unauthorized use of her
name and photograph in an advertising flyer. The defendant had
its principal place of business in Illinois, and the flyer was sent
from Illinois. Since the Rhode Island Supreme Court had never
246. Tiernan v. Westext Transp., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1256 (D.R.I. 1969);
Brown v. Church of the Holy Name of Jesus, 105 R.I. 322, 252 A.2d 176 (1969);
Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917, cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 957
(1968).
247. 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974).
248. Ford had its principal place of business in Michigan, and the Michi-
gan law relating to wrongful death recovery was the same as Rhode Island law.
Ford argued for the application of Massachusetts law.
249. 111 R.I. 657, 306 A.2d 808 (1973).
250. 338 F. Supp. 1 (D.R.I. 1972).
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overruled an older case that refused to recognize the cause of
action for invasion of privacy, the court was bound to hold that
recovery would not be allowed under Rhode Island law. Illinois
law, however, would have allowed recovery. The court empha-
sized the admonitory policy reflected in Illinois law that allowed
such an action. While application of Illinois law in this case would
not advance any compensatory interest of Illinois, it would ad-
vance this admonitory policy. By holding that Illinois law ap-
plied, the court illustrated the rule of choice of law that when the
law of the state in which the defendant acted allows recovery in
order to implement an admonitory policy, the law of the state
where the act occurred will be applied to allow recovery for harm
occurring elsewhere.
Finally, Rhode [sland has also held that the tort liability of
an employer to an employee who is covered by worker's compen-
sation is determined by the law of the state where the employer
has taken out worker's compensation to cover the particular em-
ployee. 5'
The Rhode Island rules of choice of law in tort are as follows:
(1) When Rhode Island parties are involved in an accident in
another state, Rhode Island law applies.3 2
(2) When a Rhode Island plaintiff is involved in an accident in
a nonrecovery state, Rhode Island law, allowing recovery, applies,
assuming that allowing recovery produces no unfairness to the
defendant.2"'
(3) When the defendant is from a recovery state, recovery will
be allowed irrespective of where the plaintiff resides or where the
accident occurred.
25 4
(4) When the law of the state in which an act or omission oc-
curred reflects an admonitory policy, the defendant will be held
liable when that act, causes harm in another state.
251
(5) The tort liability of an employer to an employee who is
covered by worker's compensation is determined by the law of the
251. Busby v, Perini Corp., 110 R.I. 49, 290 A.2d 210 (1972).
252. Tiernan v. Westext Transp., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1256 (D.R.I. 1969);
Brown v. Church of the Holy Name of Jesus, 105 R.I. 322, 252 A.2d 176 (1969);
Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917, cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 957
(1968).
253. See Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974).
254. See Labree v. Major, Ill R.I. 657, 306 A.2d 808 (1973).
255. See Gravina v. Brunswick Corp., 338 F. Supp. 1 (D.R.I. 1972).
1028 [Vol. 44
JUDICIAL METHOD
state where the employer has taken out worker's compensation to
cover the particular employee .15
L. Wisconsin
Most of the fact-law patterns arising in conflicts torts cases
have been before the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the federal
courts in Wisconsin. Although Wisconsin explicitly follows Lef-
lar's choice-influencing considerations, in practice the courts
have consistently applied Wisconsin law, except for the tort lia-
bility of an employer to an employee covered by worker's compen-
sation.
As is true everywhere else, when Wisconsin parties are in-
volved in an accident in another state, Wisconsin law applies."'
In Conklin v. Horner, 8 residents of Illinois, a guest statute state,
were involved in an accident in Wisconsin, a recovery state. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Wisconsin law applied. Simi-
larly, in Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co.,2' Wisconsin
law, allowing contribution, was applied in favor of a Wisconsin
defendant sued by an Illinois spouse as a result of a Wisconsin
accident, even though the law of Illinois, which recognized
spousal immunity, would not have allowed contribution against
the negligent spouse. '"
Wisconsin limits the amount of damages recoverable for
wrongful death, and Wisconsin federal courts have held that Wis-
consin law applies whenever a Wisconsin defendant is sued, ir-
respective of whether the fatal accident occurred in Wisconsin" '
256. See Busby v. Perini Corp., 110 R.I. 49, 290 A.2d 210 (1972).
257. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965). In the pre-
Babcock case of Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d
814 (1959), the court, fashioning a "rule" that spousal immunity was
"governed" by the law of the marital domicile, held that Wisconsin law allow-
ing recovery applied when two Wisconsin spouses were involved in an accident
in a spousal immunity state.
258. 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W,2d 579 (1968).
259. 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d 466 (1968).
260. See also Korth v. Mueller, 310 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Heath
v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967). These cases effectively
overrule Haynie v. Hanson, 16 Wis. 2d 299, 114 N.W.2d 443 (1962), in which
the court, following the "Haumschild rule," held that the question was
"governed" by the law of the marital domicile.
261. Satchwill v. Vollrath Co., 293 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
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or in the victim's home state." ' It is highly unlikely that a case
presenting the latter fact-law pattern-that of a recovery state
victim killed by a nonrecovery state defendant in the victim's
home state-would be brought in the defendant's home state.
The suit presumably could be brought in the victim's home state
under that state's long-arm statute. Whatever the reason, a case
was brought in a Wisconsin federal court, and faced with this true
conflict, the court not surprisingly advanced Wisconsin policy
and interest and applied Wisconsin law. '
In Slawek v. Stroh, ' suit was brought in Wisconsin by the
putative father, a resident of Pennsylvania, to obtain a declara-
tion of paternity with respect to a child from Wisconsin. The
mother, a Wisconsin resident, counterclaimed to recover for se-
duction, an action still recognized under Wisconsin law although
abolished in Pennsylvania and in New Jersey where the sexual
acts took place. The court held that Wisconsin law applied. Since
the harmful effects of the seduction would be felt in Wisconsin,
where the plaintiff resided, the case illustrates the operation of
the rule of choice of law that when a forum resident is injured in
the forum because of an act done elsewhere that creates a foresee-
able risk of harm in the forum, the forum law, allowing recovery,
applies. When presented with the "unprovided-for" case, in
which a Wisconsin defendant injured a nonrecovery state plaintiff
in a nonrecovery state, Wisconsin federal courts have held that
Wisconsin law, allowing recovery, applies.215 Finally, as to the
question of the liability of a coemployee for work-related injuries,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Hunker v. Royal Indemnity
Co., ' applied by analogy the rule of choice of law that holds that
the tort liability of an employer with respect to an employee
covered by worker's compensation is determined by the law of the
state where the employer has taken out worker's compensation
covering that particular employee. In Hunker, an Ohio plaintiff
was injured in Wisconsin while riding in an automobile driven by
an Ohio coemployee. The plaintiff received worker's compensa-
tion in Ohio, and under Ohio law the tort immunity also extended
262, Snow v. Continental Prods. Corp., 353 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
263. Id.; Satchwill v. Vollrath Co., 293 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
264. 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).
265. Decker v. Fox River Tractor Co., 324 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Wis. 1971);
Angel v. Ray, 285 F. Supp. 64 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
266. 57 Wis. 2d 588, 204 N.W.2d 897 (1973).
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to suits against coemployees for work-related injuries. Under Wis-
consin law immunity did not extend to coemployees. Although
Wisconsin sees a real interest in allowing recovery to a nonresi-
dent injured within its borders,"7 this interest was inapplicable
in the worker's compensation context. Wisconsin's compensatory
policy would be satisfied by the injured worker's ability to recover
under the Ohio statute. Therefore, the law of the state where the
particular employee was covered by worker's compensation con-
trolled. The rule of choice of law in Wisconsin on this point should
be stated to reflect the fact that it includes the liability of a
coemployee for work-related injuries."
The Wisconsin rules of choice of law in tort are as follows:
(1) When Wisconsin parties are involved in an accident in an-
other state, Wisconsin law applies.
2 '
(2) When parties from a nonrecovery state are involved in an
accident in Wisconsin, Wisconsin law, allowing recovery, ap-
plies.!'
(3) When a Wisconsin defendant is sued in Wisconsin to recover
damages resulting from a Wisconsin accident, Wisconsin law,
allowing contribution against a codefendant, applies, even
though the law of the codefendant's home state would not allow
contribution?"
(4) When a plaintiff from a recovery state is injured by a Wis-
consin defendant in an accident occurring in Wisconsin or else-
where, Wisconsin law, denying recovery, applies. 72
(5) When a Wisconsin resident is injured in Wisconsin because
of an act done elsewhere that creates a forseeable risk of harm in
Wisconsin, Wisconsin law, allowing recovery, applies.213
(6) When a Wisconsin defendant injures a plaintiff from a non-
recovery state in a nonrecovery state, Wisconsin law, allowing
recovery, applies."'
267. See Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
268. Presumably the other states would agree on this point.
269. See Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
270, See Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
271. See Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d
466 (1968); note 260 supra.
272. See Snow v. Continental Prods. Co., 353 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Wis.
1972); Satchwill v. Volrath Co., 293 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
273. See Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).
274. See Snow v. Continental Prods. Co., 353 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Wis.
1968).
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(7) The tort liability of an employer to an employee covered by
worker's compensation, as well as the liability of a coemployee for
work-related injuries, is determined by the law of the state where
the employer has taken out worker's compensation to cover the
particular employeern
IV. RULES OF CHOICE OF LAW IN TORTS: THE PERSPECTIVE OF
JUDICIAL METHOD
An analysis of the decisions in conflicts torts cases that have
arisen in the courts of the states that have abandoned the tradi-
tional approach to choice of law leads to the conclusion that these
courts have reached fairly uniform solutions. When the courts
have differed, the differences are sufficiently clear as to indicate
"majority" and "minority" views. In this section of the article, I
will set forth what may be called the general rules of choice of law
in the torts area. These are the rules that have emerged from the
decisions of the courts in the fourteen states chosen for the state-
by-state analysis." They are also supported by decisions in the
courts of the other states that have abandoned the traditional
approach, and reference to these decisions will be made as well.
The establishment of these general rules of choice of law in the
torts area clearly demonstrates that judicial method can be ap-
plied to the conflict of laws and that when it is, rules, developed
on a case-by-case basis through the normal workings of binding
precedent and stare decisis, will exist in conflicts as they do in
other areas of law. There may be disagreement with the particu-
lar rules or with the approach to choice of law under which they
have been formulated.!" The fact that the rules do exist, however,
cogently demonstrates that the alternative is not categorical
choice-of-law rules versus no rules, but rather categorical choice-
of-law rules versus rules of choice of law. Let us now turn to the
rules of choice of law in torts that have emerged from the deci-
sions of the courts in actual cases.
275. See Hunker v. Royal Indemnity Co., 57 Wis. 2d 588, 204 N.W,2d 897
(1973).
276. With regard to New York, I will be referring both to the Neumeier
rules and to the holdings in the actual cases.
277. Principally, this approach has been in terms of the policies and inter-




One: When two residents of the forum are involved in an
accident in another state, the law of the forum applies.
This is the most "universal" rule of choice of law and is
followed by all of the states that have abandoned the traditional
approach." When both parties are forum residents, the interest
278. The states included in the state-by-state analysis: California, see
Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 489 P.2d 218 (1955); Grant v. McAuliffe, 41
Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App.
3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972); Kelley v. Von Koznick, 18 Cal. App. 3d 805,
96 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1971); Illinois, see Ingersoll v. Klein, 46111. 2d 42, 262 N.E.2d
593 (1970); Wartell v. Formusa, 34 111. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966); Iowa, see
Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968); Flogel v. Flogel, 257 Iowa 54,
133 N.W.2d 907 (1965); Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410
(1965); Kentucky, see Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Minnesota,
see Meyer v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 508 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir.
1975); Duffy v. Currier, 291 F. Supp. 810 (D. Minn. 1968); Kopys v. Rechtzigel,
273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526 (1966); Balts v. BaIts, 273 Minn. 419, 142
N.W.2d 66 (1966); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel Co., 249 Minn. 376, 82 NW.2d 365
(1957); Mississippi, see Galloway v. Korzekwa, 346 F. Supp. 1086 (N.D. Miss.
1972); Fells v. Bowman, 274 So. 2d 109 (Miss. 1973); Turner v. Pickens, 235 So.
2d 272 (Miss. 1970); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Missouri,
see Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969); New Hampshire, see Dorion
v. Dorion, 109 N.H. 1, 241 A.2d 372 (1968); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222
A.2d 205 (1966); Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963);
New Jersey, see Rose v. Port of New York Auth., 61 N.J. 129, 293 A.2d 371
(1972); Melik v. Sarasohn, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967); Raskulinecz v.
Raskulinecz, 141 N.J. Super. 158, 357 A.2d 330 (Law Div. 1976); New York, see
Farber v. Smolack, 20 N.Y.2d 198, 229 N.E.2d 36, 282 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967);
Oregon, see DeFoor v. Lematta, 249 Or. 116, 437 P.2d 107 (1968); Pennsylvania,
see Kuchinic v. McChory, 422 Pa. 620, 222 A.2d 897 (1966); McSwain v. Mc-
Swain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966); Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1,
203 A.2d 796 (1964); Rhode Island, see Tiernan v. Westext Transp., Inc., 295
F. Supp. 1256 (D.R.I. 1969); Brown v. Church of the Holy Name of Jesus, 105
R.I. 322, 252 A.2d 176 (1969); Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917,
cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 957 (1968); Wisconsin, see Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis.
2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
The states not included in the state-by-state analysis: Alaska, see Arm-
strong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alaska 1968); Arizona, see Moore v. Montes,
22 Ariz. App, 562, 529 P.2d 716 (1974); Colorado, see First Nat'l Bank v. Rostek,
514 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1973); Sabel] v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 536 P.2d
1160 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); District of Columbia, see Edmunds v. Edmunds, 353
F. Supp. 287 (D.D.C. 1972); Louisiana, see Jagers v. Royal Indemnity Co., 276
So. 2d 309 (La. 1973); Maine, see Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610 (Me. 1970);
Massachusetts, see Penoski v. Penoski, 358 N.E.2d 416 (Mass. 1976); North
Dakota, see Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1972); Ohio, see Moats
v. Metropolitan Bank of Lima, 40 Ohio St. 2d 47, 319 N.E.2d 603 (1974); Fox
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of the forum is the same irrespective of where the accident occurs
since the social and economic consequences of the accident and
of allowing or denying recovery will be felt in the forum..When
the forum is a recovery state, in interest analysis terms the case
clearly presents a false conflict because the state where the acci-
dent occurs would have no interest in applying its law to deny
recovery. When the forum is a nonrecovery state, it can be con-
tended that the state where the accident occurs does have an
interest in allowing recovery to a nonresident injured there. This
interest, however, is not important to the forum, which will apply
its own law to advance its own policy and interest.
Two: When two parties from a recovery state, without regard
to forum residence, are involved in an accident in a nonrecovery
state, recovery will be allowed.
This rule of choice of law applies to the situation in which
two parties from different recovery states are involved in an acci-
dent in a nonrecovery state."' The rule also applies when two
parties from the same recovery state are involved in an accident
in a nonrecovery state and suit is brought in the nonrecovery
state or in a disinterested third stateY2' In terms of interest
analysis, this case presents the false conflict, since the plaintiff's
home state is interested in applying its law allowing recovery
while the accident state generally has no interest in applying its
law denying recovery in favor of a nonresident defendant. 2
v. Morrison Motor Freight Inc., 25 Ohio St. 2d 193, 267 N.E.2d 405 (1971);
Oklahoma, see Brickner v. Gooden, 525 P.2d 632 (Okla. 1974).
279. See, e.g., Chila v. Owens, 348 F. Supp. 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Reich
v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Pfau v. Trent
Aluminum Co., 55 N.J. 511, 263 A.2d 129 (1970). See also Myers v. Cessna
Aircraft Corp., 275 Or. 501, 553 P.2d 355 (1976) (when statute of limitations of
the home state of the plaintiff, Oregon, and of the home state of the defendant,
Washington, had not expired, suit would not be barred, even though it was
barred by the statute of limitations of the state in which the injury occurred).
280. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968);
Bruton v. Villoria, 138 Cal. App. 2d 642, 292 P.2d 638 (1956); Maffatone v.
Woodson, 99 N.J. Super. 559, 240 A.2d 693 (App. Div. 1968). Contra, Schlitz v.
Meyer, 29 Ohio St. 2d 169, 280 N.E.2d 925 (1972) (Ohio guest statute applies
to bar suit in which Kentucky parties were involved in an accident in Ohio).
281. See, e.g., Fuller v. Greenup, 267 Cal. App. 2d 10, 72 Cal. Rptr. 531
(1968).
282. It would have an interest if its law barring recovery represented an
admonitory policy, but no cases involving this question have arisen.
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Three: When two parties from a nonrecovery state are in-
volved in an accident in a recovery state, and suit is brought in
the recovery state, the courts are divided, with the majority view
being that the forum should apply its own law allowing
recovery. 21
When parties from a nonrecovery state are involved in an
accident in a recovery state, the plaintiff will most likely bring
suit in the recovery state, obtaining jurisdiction under its long-
arm statute. In my own view, discussed more fully elsewhere," 4
the state of injury has no real interest in applying its own law
since the social and economic consequences of the accident will
be felt in the victim's home state. The majority of the courts
passing on this question have seen it differently. These decisions
may be explained simply in terms of the forum's preference for
its own "better law" in this situation.2 It may be anticipated
that the courts will continue to differ on the proper solution in
these cases.
Four: When a forum resident suffers injury in the forum ei-
ther because of an act done there or because of an act done else-
where that creates a foreseeable risk of harm in the forum, the
forum will apply its own law allowing recovery.
Since the forum has a real interest in applying its law allow-
ing recovery in favor of its resident injured in the forum, it will
apply its own law, not only when the act causing injury occurs
there,2' but also when an act done elsewhere creates a foreseeable
283. Recovery was allowed in the following states:
Kentucky, see Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968); Minnesota, see
Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973); Missouri, see Griggs
v. Riley, 489 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972]; New Hampshire, see Gagne v.
Berry, 112 N.H. 125, 290 A.2d 624 (1972); Wisconsin, see Conklin v. Homer, 38
Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
Recovery was denied in the following states:
Mississippi, see Vick v. Cochran, 316 So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1975); New York (the
second Neumeier rule is applicable if the parties are from the same state; if they
are from different states, recovery probably would be allowed under the third
Neumeier rule); North Dakota, see Mager v. Mager, 197 N.W.2d 626 (N.D.
1972].
284. See Sedler, supra note 141, at 382-83.
285. This is brought out most clearly in cases like Conklin and Gagne in
which the choice-influencing consideration of the "better law" is explicitly dis-
cussed.
286. There are no cases directly dealing with this question, probably be-
cause the result would be so obvious that no one would bother to litigate it. The
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risk of harm in the forum."' Since it is foreseeable that an act
done elsewhere can create a risk of harm in the forum state, there
is no unfairness in requiring the actor to anticipate the applica-
tion of the forum's law, even when the act takes place in a nonre-
covery state.
Five: When a plaintiff from a recovery state is injured by a
defendant from a nonrecovery state in the defendant's home
state, the courts are divided, with the majority view appearing to
be that the forum should apply its own law in the absence of
unfairness to the defendant.
This situation, of course, presents the true conflict. The
plaintiff's home state is interested in applying its own law allow-
ing its resident to recover, while the defendant's home state is
equally interested in applying its own law to protect the defend-
ant and the insurer. Recovery was denied in Oregon in Casey v.
Manson Construction & Engineering Co., 2 and in Pennsylvania
in Cipolla v. Shaposka,28 ' both of which are comparatively
"older" cases as choice-of-law cases go.94 In Kentucky, recovery
was allowed in Foster v. Leggett,"' but in that case the transac-
tion giving rise to the accident had extensive factual contacts
with Kentucky. In New York the matter is confused because of
cases involving the question of whether a forum defendant is entitled to contri-
bution from a nonresident under the forum's law are analogous, however. In that
situation, Wisconsin and Ohio have applied their own law, but Pennsylvania has
not. See Zurzola v. General Motors Corp., 503 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1974); Saalfrank
v. O'Daniel, 390 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d
468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968); Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d
98, 156 N.W.2d 466 (1968).
287. California, Moore v. Greene, 431 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1970); Bernhard
v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976);
Mississippi, Hyde Constr. Co., Inc. v. Koehring Co., 387 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.
Miss. 1974), modified, 546 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1977); New Hampshire, Stephan
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 N.H, 248, 266 A.2d 855 (1970); Pennsylvania,
Suchomajcz v. Hummel Chem. Co., 524 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1975); Wisconsin,
Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).
288. 247 Or. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967).
289. 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970).
290. In Kliner v. Weirton Steel Co., 381 F. Supp. 275 (N.D. Ohio 1974),
the court held that when an Ohio victim was killed due to the negligence of a
West Virginia defendant in West Virginia, the law of West Virginia, limiting the
damages recoverable for wrongful death, applied.
291. 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972).
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the seeming inconsistency between the second Neumeier rule and
the holding in Miller v. Miller,2 which the second circuit
"reconciled" in Rosenthal v. Warrenn3 by carving out a "public
policy" exception to Neumeier in wrongful death cases.714 Minne-
sota has applied Minnesota law in this situation without regard
to Minnesota's factual contacts with the transaction giving rise
to the accident,35 and the first circuit has held that Rhode Island
would also apply its law.?" Under an "interest and fairness" test,
the forum should apply its own law without regard to factual
contacts, unless the application of its law would be unfair to the
other party. Barrett v. Foster Grant Co."' may illustrate the un-
fairness of the application of forum law. Since it will frequently
be possible to obtain jurisdiction in the plaintiff's home state
when a recovery state plaintiff is injured by a nonrecovery state
defendant in the defendant's home state," ' litigation on this point
is likely to continue. To the extent that the courts will forth-
rightly apply interest analysis to conflicts problems, the "interest
and fairness" test will ordinarily lead to the application of the
forum's law in this situation, and recovery will be allowed.
Six: When a plaintiff from a recovery state is injured by a
defendant from a nonrecovery state, and suit is brought in the
defendant's home state, the defendant's state will apply its own
law, denying recovery.
When jurisdiction cannot be obtained in the plaintiffs home
state, and the suit is brought in the defendant's home state, the
defendant's state will apply its own law, since it has a real inter-
est in doing so to protect its resident defendant and insurer.
Practically all of the cases involve the situation in which the
292. 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
293. 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973).
294. See notes 65-67 supra and accompanying text.
295. See notes 152-53 supra and accompanying text.
296. See Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968).
297. 450 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir. 1971).
298. This will be so either because the defendant enterprise is doing busi-
ness in the forum or because the defendant may otherwise be subject to suit
there, such as in New York under Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d
312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). After Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), it is
presumably no longer possible for the parties to arrange for personal service
there, as was done in Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970). As
to the status of Seider jurisdiction after Shaffer, see Sedler, Judicial Jurisdiction
and Choice of Law in Interstate Accident Cases, 1978 WAsH. U.L.Q. -.
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accident occurs in the defendant's home state.99 Yet the interest
of the forum in protecting its resident defendant, and insurer is
no different when the accident occurs in the plaintiff's home
state. In fact, in the one case in which the accident occurred in
the plaintiff's home state, the defendant's home state applied its
own law, 01
Seven: When the law of the state in which an act or omission
occurs reflects an admonitory policy, the defendant will be held.
liable if that act causes harm in another state.
In this situation, the state in which the act or omission occurs
has an interest in applying its own law in order to implement the
admonitory policy reflected in that law. Ordinarily the state in
which the harm occurs would have no interest in insulating the
actor from liability, since the actor will usually be a resident of
the state where the act or omission occurs. Such an interest could
exist if the actor were a resident of the forum and the forum's law
did not impose liability. Cases presenting this situation, however,
have not arisen. In the cases that have arisen, the courts have
always imposed liability by applying the law of the state in which
the act occurs. 0'
Eight: When a plaintiff from a nonrecovery state is involved
in an accident with a defendant from a recovery state, recovery
will generally be allowed irrespective of where the accident
occurs.
This rule of choice of law is stated in this way because, with
the exception of Neumeier, the courts have allowed recovery in
this situation even when the accident occurs in a nonrecovery
state. It is generally agreed that recovery will be allowed when the
accident occurs in a recovery state.30 2 In cases arising in Minne-
299. New Hampshire, Maguire v. Exeter & Hampton Elec. Co., 114 N.H.
589, 325 A.2d 778 (1974); New Jersey, Colley v. Harvey Cedars Marina, 422 F.
Supp. 953 (D.N.J. 1976); Wisconsin, Satchwill v. VolLrath Co., 293 F. Supp. 533
(E.D. Wis. 1968).
300. Snow v. Continental Prods. Corp., 353 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
301. District of Columbia, Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
cf. Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, 357 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (New York
law applied to determine liability for accident occurring in District of Colum-
bia); Iowa, Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974); New
Jersey, White v. Smith, 398 F. Supp. 130 (D.N.J. 1975); Rhode Island, Gravina
v. Brunswick Corp., 338 F. Supp. 1 (D.R.[. 1972); Washington, Werner v. Wer-
ner, 84 Wash. 2d 360, 526 P,2d 370 (1974).
302. Recovery is allowed in this situation under the third Neumeier rule.
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sota, 3 New Jersey,H Oregon, 35 Rhode Island,301 Washington,'"
and Wisconsin,S recovery has also been allowed when the acci-
dent occurred in a nonrecovery state. California has also indi-
cated that, regardless of where the accident occurred, it would
allow recovery whenever a California defendant is involved."
Since New York appears to be the only exception to this trend,1"'
it seems fair to state that the general rule of choice of law is in
favor of allowing recovery irrespective of where the accident oc-
curred.
Nine: The tort liability of an employer to an employee who
is covered by worker's compensation is determined by the law of
the state where the employer has taken out worker's compensa-
tion to cover the particular employee.
See also Hurtado v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522
P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974); State ex rel. Broglin v. Nangle, 510 S.W.2d
699 (Mo. 1974).
303, See Allen v. Gannaway, 294 Minn. 1, 199 N.W.2d 424 (1972); Bol-
grean v. Stitch, 293 Minn. 8, 196 N.W.2d 442 (1972).
304. See Van Dyke v. Bolves, 107 N.J. Super. 338, 258 A.2d 372 (App. Div.
1969).
305. See Erwin v. Thomas, 264 Or. 454, 506 P.2d 494 (1973).
306. See Labree v. Major, 111 R.I. 657, 306 A.2d 808 (1973).
307. See Johnson v. Spider Staging Co., 87 Wash. 2d 577, 555 P.2d 997
(1976) (when a Kansas resident was killed in Kansas due to the negligence of a
Washington defendant, Washington law, allowing unlimited recovery for wrong-
ful death, applied).
308. See note 262 supra.
309. Hurtado v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 11 Cal. 3d 574,
580-83, 522 P.2d 666, 670-71, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106, 110-11 (1974), The court also
questioned the holding of the California Appellate Court in Ryan v. Clark
Equip. Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 679, 74 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1969), that when an Oregon
victim was killed in Oregon while operating a vehicle manufactured by a Michi-
gan defendant, the Oregon limitation on the amount recoverable for wrongful
death applied. 268 Cal. App. 2d at 683, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
310. In Patch v. Stanley Works, 448 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1971), a New Hamp-
shire victim was killed in New Hampshire due to the negligence of a Connecticut
defendant. The second circuit said that if the case had been brought in New
Hampshire, New Hampshire would apply its own law, limiting recovery for
wrongful death, rather than Connecticut law, allowing unlimited recovery. The
question of what New Hampshire would do arose indirectly, since the second
circuit was sitting as a Connecticut state court, and Connecticut would apply
the law of New Hampshire as the law of the place of the wrong. The plaintiff
argued that Connecticut would look to the "whole law" of New Hampshire, and
it was in this context that the court concluded that New Hampshire would apply
its own law on this question. Id. at 492.
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This rule of choice of law is as "universal" as the rule that
the state of the parties' common residence will apply its own law
to an accident involving those parties in another state."' It illus-
trates the situation in which the courts have agreed that only one
state has a real interest in applying its law on the point in issue.
The policy of all states relating to worker's compensation recovery
and considerations of fairness to the employer are best served by
looking to the law of the state in which the employer has taken
out worker's compensation to cover the particular employee.
These nine rules of choice of law in tort, or more accurately,
rules of choice-of-law situations, are the product of the applica-
tion of judicial method to the conflict of laws. They result from
the decisions of the courts in actual cases and have evolved
through the normal workings of binding precedent and stare de-
cisis. The conflict of laws is said to be an area in which there is
"extreme disagreement among both judges and commentators
not simply over the details of choice-of-law policy but over the
most fundamental principles of the subject."3' 2 When, however,
the subject is approached with reference to the results reached in
actual cases by the courts that have abandoned the traditional
approach, rather than with reference to the explanation the
courts give for their decisions or the particular methodology they
are purportedly following, it is clear that there is relatively little
disagreement among the courts over the proper solution to the
kinds of conflicts torts problems that arise in practice.
In actuality, there is disagreement over only three of these
nine rules of choice of law in tort. According to Rule Three, when
two parties from a nonrecovery state are involved in an accident
in a recovery state, the recovery state courts differ over whether
to apply their own law or to defer to the policy of the parties'
311. California, Howe v. Diversified Builders, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 741,
69 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1968); Illinois, Kabak v. Thor Power Tool Co., 106 Ill. App.
2d 190, 245 N.E.2d 596 (1969); Oregon, Davis v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 289 F.
Supp. 835 (D. Ore. 1968); Pennsylvania, Elston v. Industrial Lift Truck Co., 420
Pa. 97, 216 A.2d 318 (1966); Rhode Island, Busby v. Perini Co., 110 R.I. 49, 290
A.2d 210 (1972). In Tennessee, which continues to follow the "place of the
wrong" rule, this rule of choice of law is also in effect. See Hundall v. S. & W.
Constr. Co., 60 Tenn. App. 743, 451 S.W.2d 858 (1969). Likewise, this rule is
in effect in Nevada, although Nevada has had no other recent cases involving
choice of law in torts. See Tab Constr. Co. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 83 Nev.
364, 432 P.2d 90 (1967).
312. R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE, & H. KAY, supra note 1, at 7.
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home state. According to Rule Five, when a plaintiff from a recov-
ery state is involved in an accident with a defendant from a
nonrecovery state in the defendant's home state and suit is
brought in the plaintiffs home state, the majority of courts have
employed an "interest and fairness" test and have applied their
own law as long as it produces no unfairness to the defendant, as
it usually does not. Although some courts disagree, the clear trend
appears to be in favor of finding liability in this situation. When
a plaintiff from a nonrecovery state is involved in an accident
with a defendant from a recovery state, recovery will always be
allowed when the accident occurs in the recovery state; and, with
the exception of New York, recovery has been allowed when the
accident occurs in the nonrecovery state as well. Far more signifi-
cant than the disagreement over three of the rules is the fact that
there has been general agreement among the courts on the other
six rules of choice of law.
V. CONCLUSION
Judicial method, once it is properly understood and applied
to the process of deciding conflicts cases, leads to rules of choice
of law just as it does in other areas of law. It is these rules of choice
of law that will furnish a guide to the resolution of future cases,
and to that extent choice of law becomes more "certain and pre-
dictable." Most importantly, however, the rules of choice of law
that result, unlike categorical choice-of-law rules, are based on
the decisions of the courts in actual cases-decisions that were
rendered with reference to considerations of policy and fairness
to the parties and decisions that have been remarkably similar on
the part of all courts called upon to make them. We do not need
choice-of-law rules. We have rules of choice of law.
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